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INTRODUCTION 
Is eradication of corruption a myth or a reality—can a pervasively corrupt traffic 
police system of a former Soviet Union country transform from ‘rotten pigs’ (menty 
poganiye) to ‘reputable inspectors’, which do not take bribes? Employing a game-
theoretic approach, this thesis develops a model of micro-level traffic police bribery in 
order to demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that given the right 
combination of changes that affect the incentives of drivers and traffic policemen alike, 
the answer can be “Yes” and successful curbing of corruption is not a myth, but within 
policy reach. 
Corruption is most commonly defined as 'abuse of a position of power for 
private gain'. Although such behaviour is not a new phenomenon, it has been receiving 
an increasing amount of attention in the past several decades. In academic literature, in 
public policy discourse, among practitioners of international development and in the 
business environment, the word 'corruption' is now commonly used, sometimes 
pejoratively and sometimes as a statement of fact. Several main classifications have 
emerged based on who the participants are: corporate corruption1, political corruption2, 
bureaucratic corruption3; there can also be a supply-side and demand-side analysis, 
where the actor on the demand side of corruption is in a position of power, while the 
actor on the supply side provides the payment. A distinction is usually made between 
grand corruption and petty corruption, based primarily on the size of the private gain4 
and the number of actors involved. Further basic taxonomy includes one-time 
interactions versus repeated interactions, extortive5 versus voluntary6 corruption, 
                                                 
1 At least one of the actors is corporate. 
2 Involves an elected official and is most often referred to in the context of paying to influence the voting 
outcome. 
3 Involves a government official, most typically with reference to issue of licensing, permits, etc. 
4 The size of the bribe in many cases. 
5 by person in the position of power. 
6 by person in the position of supply. 
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payment in order to expedite a legal procedure7 as opposed to payment for illegal 
purposes, such as misreporting information or not reporting a violation so as to avoid 
official punishment. Last but not least, corruption can be analysed through the dynamics 
of a particular sector, such as construction, education, health and medicine, utilities, 
insurance, inspection of a polluting plant, traffic police, etc. 
This thesis has a sectoral, regional and methodological focus. The sectoral focus 
is on traffic police bribery, an interaction between a driver and a traffic policeman—
driver on the supply side and policeman on the demand side—which takes place when a 
traffic police officer stops the driver for violating some traffic law8. The regional focus 
is on the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet 
Union, which have in common a historical past of authoritarian police and have 
undergone, partially or fully, economic transition from central planning to free market. 
Traffic police bribery is modelled and tested using game theory, a mathematical 
method9.  
From the economics standpoint, bribery is often either an unnecessary cost or an 
efficiency-improving mechanism. The author of this thesis takes neither a pre-
established approach to corruption—as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’—nor a moral undertone. 
Bribery is examined neutrally as a transaction of choice, in order to better understand 
the micro-level economic incentives behind it. The ‘efficiency-improving’ approach to 
corruption is not applicable in this case of traffic police bribery because this is a case 
where driver pays the traffic policeman to not file an official protocol of administrative 
or criminal violation of traffic law, as opposed to other possible cases of police 
bribery10. 
The phenomenon of corruption is prevalent in developed, less-developed and 
under-developed countries, and hence is a topical subject. General consensus is that 
corruption hinders development via its negative impact on economic growth, the rule of 
law, institutions, income inequality, FDI, regime legitimacy, and so forth11. On a 
                                                 
7 Also referred to as “speed money” 
8 Regardless of whether the driver actually violated some traffic law or not. 
9 The theoretical framework of interactive choice, rationalities, utility-maximization and game theory is 
presented in Chapter I. 
10 A ‘speed money’ example of police bribery could be expediting the legal processing of driving license 
or license plates. However, unofficial payment to illegally obtain a driving license or license plates 
without prescribed testing or inspection cannot be considered ‘speed money’. 
11 See literature review section of this thesis for more details. 
5 
 
worldwide level, there has been a large amount of debate and initiatives worldwide 
specifically aimed at curbing or eradicating corruption. Yet, most recent anti-corruption 
programmes have not lead to a significant reduction in the level of corruption (Svensson 
2005, pp.34-36, 40).  
The transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the 
remaining Former Soviet Union countries represent a regional set that is interesting to 
study. Emerging from the similar economic and rule-of-law systems characteristic of 
planned economies and communist societies, these countries had similarly high level of 
corruption following the dissolution of Soviet Union. In all these countries, from 
Hungary to Kazakhstan, shadow economy was significant, economic transactions were 
frequently informal or under-reported, while personal relationships were important for 
access to deficit goods and services. Moreover, police was authoritarian and served as a 
mechanism for purposes of societal control rather than public goods provision. 
Subsequently, following independence, these countries implemented different sets of 
economic, political, and institutional reforms with measures that led to a varying degree 
of impact on the level of corruption in general, and on the pervasiveness of traffic police 
bribery in particular. 
 Figure 1 shows transition dynamics in terms of the level of corruption, 
highlighting that the greatest positive change over the shortest period of time took place 
in Georgia. It is noteworthy that the starting level of corruption also mattered, 
particularly for countries like Estonia and Poland. Countries like Ukraine and Russia 
have not been dramatically successful, while Belarus exhibited the opposite trend of 
worsening corruption. 
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Figure 1. Change in the level of corruption in select transition countries,1998-2009 
 
Source: Transparency International 
 
In terms of contribution that traffic police bribery carries towards economic and 
socio-political development of a country, classification 'petty' is a misnomer. Extortive 
traffic police corruption represents an added uncertainty (hence risk and cost) for freight 
and other road-based shipments, negatively impacting businesses and the national 
investment climate, and along with it the level of FDI and economic growth. The ability 
to pay one's way out of severe traffic violations undermines the rule of law and the 
criminology system of deterrents and penalties in place. Ample possibilities to bribe 
traffic policemen encourage and perpetuate violation of traffic laws, negatively 
impacting road safety12. The comparative statistics in Figures 2 and 3 show that road 
safety is worse in CEE and FSU region than in many developed countries.  
                                                 
12 In an extreme case, a driver who plans to drink and knows that traffic police is corruptible, can set 
aside some money intended for the traffic policeman in case s/he is stopped for drunk driving. As a result, 
the traditional fine deterrent of crime no longer works in the presence of bribery and there are likely to be 
more traffic fatalities. 
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Figure 2. Traffic Fatality Rate in CEE and FSU versus Select Developed Countries,  
in 2009 
 
 
Source: World Health Organization (2009) 
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traffic fatality rate, which is in the low range of 5-10 deaths per 100,00013. Last but not 
least, widely-known presence of corruption in police also undermines regime legitimacy 
and trust of the government institutions, which is particularly important in post-socialist 
and formerly authoritarian societies transitioning to democratic principles (Caparini and 
Marenin, 2005). 
The aim of the research is to develop a game-theoretic framework for modelling 
of traffic police bribery. In order to accomplish this aim, the first task is to build a 
model, and the second task is to apply empirical cases to the model in order to test it. 
Hence, the first task is to find conditions when both the driver and traffic policeman end 
up in a no-corruption equilibrium, and the relevant policy tools to influence the change 
from a corruption to a no-corruption outcome. The next task is applying the scenarios 
from real cases of traffic police reform on the theoretical model to determine whether 
the model explains the difference in outcome of the Georgian and Ukrainian cases. In 
other words, the task is to determine whether the results of the anti-corruption practice 
were in line with the model’s predictions and policy tools; if not, the task is to 
determine why the model did not hold.  
Hence, this thesis is both a theoretical and anempirical examination of traffic 
police bribery: three game-theoretic models are developed; then tested with an 
empirical application. Two types of methods are use—qualitative and mathematical. In-
depth interviews are used to generate the variables in the theoretical models. Two case 
studies of anti-corruption traffic police reform in Georgia and Ukraine are used as 
empirical applications. In-depth interviews and case studies are part of qualitative 
research method, while three game-theoretic models are part of mathematical modelling 
method. 
 The overarching research question of the study is “What measures impact the 
level of traffic police bribery, and to what extent?”. The answer to the research question 
shows what determinants of drivers’ and police officers’ behaviour, and to what extent, 
need to be affected by an anti-corruption programme in order to make such programme 
successful. Based on theoretical and empirical parts, the research question can be 
broken down into sub-questions: 
                                                 
13 Although there is probably no direct causality link between the level of corruption and traffic fatalities, 
the correlation shows that there could be an indirect connection, thus confirming the potential safety 
significance of anti-corruption in traffic police. 
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1.  “What combination of changes in salary, fine, probability of detection, etc. 
generates the shift from a corruption equilibrium to no-corruption equilibrium?”  
2. “How have changes in salary, fine, probability of detection, etc. impacted the 
level of traffic police bribery in transition countries like Georgia and Ukraine?” 
The two cases of Ukraine and Georgia are best to test the application of a theoretical 
model. Ukrainian reforms targeted one set of variables, while Georgian reforms targeted 
another set of variables. In the case of both, reform measures were drastic enough and 
generated concrete impact on the frequency of traffic police bribery—substantial 
decrease in Georgia, and moderate increase in Ukraine. 
Based on current literature, the micro-variables that determine payoffs in game-
theoretic set-up (and therefore the individual decisions) include the amount of bribe, 
probability of getting caught, punishment if caught, official salary, and so forth. One of 
the three theoretical models is in part based on Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang 
models, and extended by the addition of several variables. The other two models are 
author’s own work. The insight to use additional variables, for all three models, comes 
from in-depth interviews with several drivers and traffic policemen from transition 
countries. This can be visually represented in the following manner: 
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Figure 3. Thesis overview 
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penalty for accepting a bribe, and premiums—decreases corruptibility of traffic police 
officers. Among these, I speculate that increasing policeman’s salary has the greatest 
impact potential in transition countries. On the driver’s side, an increase in procedural 
ease of paying for the ticket and a decrease in repercussions to the driver for having a 
traffic violation on file also negatively impact the level of traffic police bribery. I also 
speculate that both measures—decreasing the difference and decreasing 
repercussions—have relatively same amount of impact. If the anti-corruption 
programmes for traffic police in transition countries do not lead to a significant 
reduction in the level of corruption, that is because the reforms target insignificant 
determinants and/or insufficiently affect the significant determinants and therefore do 
not induce a shift from a corruption to no-corruption equilibrium. 
Although the amount of literature on corruption (spanning from sociology, to 
political science and economics) is vast and increasing, it is highly fragmented, not 
exhaustive and many aspects of this phenomenon remain poorly or completely 
unexplained. The key advantage of this study is combining a theoretical game-theoretic 
model with its empirical application. Methodologically, corruption research to-date is 
frequently scrutinised because it relies on subjective measures or aggregate data at the 
national level (Mocan 2004). This thesis takes a novel approach to the methodological 
challenge of corruption research. Neither subjective nor national data is used; instead, 
interviews provide forty-two cases of real driver-policemen interactions that took place, 
on the basis of which a generic game-theoretic model for the interaction is derived. This 
provides a contribution to the theoretical work of Bowles-Garoupa (1995) and Chang-
Lai-Yang (2000) by addition of variables and a modelling distinction based on 
bargaining power. Last but not least, outcomes and conclusions of the research are 
meant to provide additional insight for ongoing experimentation and evaluation of new 
tools to combat corruption. For instance, decreasing corruption in the traffic police 
seems to be on the agenda of Russian president Medvedev following several recent 
scandals, but no tangible measures have been taken yet. 
Basic possible limitations of research include low sample size of interview 
respondents and national case studies, access to literature and possible bias of the 
English-language literature on the Georgian reform. Nevertheless, this research employs 
innovative approaches, uses original data, and provides a substantial contribution to the 
12 
 
study of traffic police bribery and anti-corruption, from an economic and policy 
perspective. 
The thesis is structured in the following manner. First, the analytical framework 
of the research is set-up in detail in Chapter I. Following brief overview of the 
underlying theories of human rationality and decision-making, a case is made that 
traffic police bribery is best examined through a game-theory perspective. Examination 
of economic literature on corruption, including several key mathematical models and 
economic models of crime, reveals a gap that examination of traffic police bribery (both 
theoretical and empirical) can fill with a multi-method approach. Methodology of the 
research is then presented in detail; limitations and solutions acknowledged.  
Second, the three models are set-up, developed and analysed in Chapter II. 
Additional variables and insights are first derived and summarised based on the in-depth 
interviews. Then, Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang models are augmented with 
additional variables. By challenging a key assumption of the Bowles-Garoupa and 
Chang-Lai-Yang model, a case is made to model situations where there is positive rent 
to be gained by both players, but they cannot agree to split it. The resulting two 
models—one where a driver has a bargaining advantage and one where a police officer 
has a bargaining advantage—are presented and anlaysed. In sum, the findings and 
respective anti-corruption tools from the three models are compared.  
Third, two cases of traffic police reform are presented in Chapter III. The impact 
of anti-corruption changes is compared to the anticipated impact from the theoretical 
models. All in all, the usefulness of models is evaluated. Lastly, in Chapter IV, policy 
recommendations are elaborated in greater depth; the anti-corruption tools effective 
both theoretically and in practice and presented. Conclusions are drawn from the 
research with a special focus on support for traditional and new anti-corruption theories, 
types of human rationality, and applicability of game-theory. Several possibilities for 
future research on the subject are suggested. 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I. FRAMEWORK 
 
 This chapter presents the framework of the study—the theoretical basics, 
relevant literature on economics of corruption, and research methodology. First, 
underlying theories of human rationality and decision-making are presented and a case 
is made that traffic police bribery involves interactive choices and therefore micro-level 
modelling requires a game-theoretic approach. Next, main approaches in the economics 
literature on corruption are outlined and past mathematical modelling of corruption is 
presented in greater detail to demonstrate that a gap in examination of single-sector 
bribery, like the case of traffic police, can be filled with a study that is both theoretical 
an empirical, employing an approach that combines qualitative and mathematical 
methods. Lastly, research methodology is described in detail, acknowledging the 
limitations and ways used to mitigate such limitations.  
 
 
Theories of Choice 
 
When approaching the study of corrupt behaviour on the micro level, it is first 
necessary to take a step back and look at the underlying theoretical framework of 
human behaviour and decision-making. The theoretical framework in this case concerns 
the question “How do people choose?”14, a question when applied to traffic police 
bribery becomes, “how does a driver choose to offer/give or not to offer/give a bribe?” 
and “how does traffic policeman choose to ask/take or not to ask/take a bribe?”. Even 
though for anti-corruption purposes the main question is why people choose to engage 
in a corrupt transaction, it is nevertheless important to look at the ‘how’ side as well; 
                                                 
14 In other words, which factors influence decision-making 
14 
 
because ‘how’ people choose influences the actual choice. Heap et al (1992) succinctly 
address this question in The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide, which forms a basis 
for this section. This section first presents the theories relevant to the study of corrupt 
behaviour from an economic perspective. Next, the soundness of these theories are 
briefly weighted against their limits. Last but not least, a case is made that game theory 
is most suitable for understanding traffic police bribery and modelling it. 
Types of individual rationality 
An ‘individual choice’, where only one person is involved, is different from an 
‘interactive choice’, where two or more people are involved and one person’s choice is 
affected by another person/s’ choice(s). In case of an individual choice, the individual 
acts with certain rationality when s/he has a set of identifiable objectives, and makes a 
choice that is most likely to satisfy those objectives (Heap et al 1992, p.3). Given this 
definition of rationality, three classifications of rationalities are possible, describing 
how an individual makes a choice:  
1) instrumental and utility-maximizing rationality: individual compares utility 
generated by each action and acts so as to maximise utility; 
2) bounded rationality: an individual uses rules of thumb, simple procedures, 
expectations and past experience due to the limited computational capacity of 
the brain and limited information or time; 
3) expressive rationality: an individual is guided by the value of the outcome, 
incorporating personal beliefs and cultural norms. 
These three types of individual rationality are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
complementary insights into human motivation, and depending on the circumstances, an 
individual can act as an instrumental and utility-maximizing agent, as a rationally-
bounded agent, or based on a matter of principle. (p.24) 
The economics discipline and economic literature on corruption to date is 
primarily concerned with the first type of rationality, and sometimes incorporates 
elements of the second type1516. The notion that humans are self-interested beings who 
have the ability to make judgment towards their subjectively defined ends also fits 
                                                 
15 Using dynamic models that include past experience, for instance 
16 An exception is work by Rothstein (2007), which calls for a dynamic and evolutionary approach that 
incorporates the perception of corruption  and therefore belief about actions of all others in society. 
15 
 
within the positivist epistemology. Procedurally, the advantage of utility-maximising 
rationality is the relative ease of calculating the expected result and predictability of that 
result. Yet there are limits to the notion of instrumentality (that the individuals have the 
‘instruments’ to calculate). For one, in empirical studies, the utility-maximisation result 
obtained based on assumptions of that rationality differs from the result people actually 
choose. Thus, the theoretical assumptions of the informational structure frequently do 
not hold.  
The combination of utility-maximising and satisficing logic explains well how 
people choose individually—when one individual’s action does not affect anyone else 
and nobody else’s actions affect that individual, or when the individual is a tiny part of 
a large competitive economy and the individual’s choice of which milk to buy, for 
example, does not affect the price of milk the producer establishes, given that the price 
of milk affects the individual’s decision regarding which milk to buy. However, in all 
other circumstances, when an individual’s choice is not based solely on his/her 
objectives, but also on the anticipated actions or reactions of others, then using simple 
utility-maximising or satisficing logic is no longer sufficient (p.93). In such 
circumstances, the problem is that of an interactive choice. 
Game theory: an interactive choice 
The primary framework of an interactive choice approach is game theory. The 
‘game’ here is a situation in which the actions of one person perceptibly affect the 
behaviour of another and vice versa. In this approach, common in microeconomics, 
individuals are still both rational and utility-optimisers. Yet with an added twist. The 
basic method of game theory is such that in making a choice, individuals try to predict 
what other(s) will do in reply to their own actions, and then optimise their actions  on 
the understanding that other(s) are thinking in the same way.  
Rational behaviour, in the basic form, can be expressed mathematically as a 
calculation of all potential costs and benefits. Game theory takes this to the next level, 
where rational players evaluate their cost and benefit depending on the choices of 
others. For instance, in a simple two-player game, where each player has two strategies, 
the payoff for one player depends on the choice of the second player. The figure below 
illustrates this concept as well as the normal presentation of a two-player, two-strategy 
16 
 
game. In this game, a dominant strategy emerges when regardless of strategy of Player 
B, Player A’s payoff is always greater. In other words, a dominant strategy of a player 
is such that whatever the opponent does, the player will always be better off. When both 
players have a dominant strategy, then there is an equilibrium of the game. 
Figure 4. Game-theoretic set-up for a simultaneous game 
  Player A 
  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
Player B Strategy 1 Payoff for B / Payoff for A Payoff for B / Payoff for A 
Strategy 2 Payoff for B / Payoff for A Payoff for B / Payoff for A 
 
Such normal presentation is for simultaneous games, where both players decide 
and act simultaneously. When the game is not simultaneous, i.e., sequential or dynamic, 
the extensive form is used to denote which player decides on the strategy and acts first: 
 
Figure 5. Sequential game-theoretic set-up 
 
 
 
 
Player B 
 
 
  Strategy 1   Payoff for B / Payoff for A 
 
Strategy 1 
Player A 
 
  
  Strategy 2   Payoff for B / Payoff for A 
    
   
 
 
 
Strategy 2 
Player A 
 
Strategy 1   Payoff for B / Payoff for A 
   
Strategy 2 
 
  Payoff for B / Payoff for A 
 
The primary critique of game theory is based on informational constraints of the 
human brain. Where complex calculations are involved, or the game is said to involve 
iterated strategies, it is doubtful that individuals go through the technical optimising 
approach that involves substantial calculations of the formal game theory. As such, 
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game theory is more valid when individuals have clear dominant strategies that are 
relatively straightforward and intuitive to calculate.  
The following section demonstrates that bribery in general, and particularly 
involving traffic policemen, is very much a game. Moreover, game-theoretic approach 
is valid for this study because the calculations for players involved are relatively simple 
and straightforward given their objectives. 
Traffic police bribery as a game 
Corruption is commonly defined as abuse of position of power for private gain, 
implying economic incentives in the very definition via ‘private gain’. In micro-level 
interaction of people with bureaucrats who provide and control public services, the 
person in a position of power has the monopolistic supply of service; the person in a 
weaker position is in a position to demand the service. Private gain of additional income 
for the monopolistic supplier by circumventing, speeding up or in some other way 
altering the application of the law, is a basic economic incentive for the bribe-receiving 
part. For the supplier of a bribe, decreasing the processing time, or obtaining the desired 
result where it otherwise would not be possible or would be more complicated, is also 
an economic incentive—saving time and avoiding hassle. 
In this sense, many interactions where bribery could potentially occur can be 
seen as a two-player, two-strategy game. The person in a position of power has two 
options: to accept or not to accept a bribe, while the person in the requesting position 
has the option to suggest or not to suggest a bribe. In each circumstance, the perceived 
benefits and cost to each player depend on the strategy selected by the other player. 
Payoffs can be shown mathematically for each scenario as costs and benefits, that 
influence the decision and therefore game theory is applicable. 
Conceptually, bribery in a situation where a traffic policeman stops a driver who 
violated some traffic rule can be mostly seen as a sequential game. In most cases this 
interaction involves a ‘signal’—overt or covert on behalf of either party regarding their 
preferred strategy—or a straightforward first action by one of the two players.  Traffic 
police bribery is a one-time interaction that is not repeated over time between the same 
two actors; this is also petty corruption in the sense that it involves modest sums of 
money and takes place literally on the street level. This type of bribery can be both 
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extortive or voluntary: extortive in the case when policeman forces the driver into a 
bribe; voluntary in the case when the driver is the first mover. A third kind, in between 
extortive and voluntary, can also take place with signalling on behalf of the policeman 
or the driver.  
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Economic literature on corruption is vast and fragmented. Mathematical models, 
including game-theoretic ones, are not very common. This section overviews the main 
approaches in the study of corruption from an economic perspective and the 
mathematical models of corruption. It is demonstrated that a mixed-method approach of 
this thesis, alongside several other contributions to mathematical modelling, are most 
substantial contributions of this thesis.  
Main economic approaches 
The theoretical literature on corruption address the questions of definitions, 
measurement issues, relationship to efficiency—as a question of higher transaction 
costs versus ‘speed money’—also corruption’s magnitude, pervasiveness, as well as 
causes (i.e., determinants) and consequences (i.e. impact on economic growth, etc.). 
Jain’s (2001) survey of literature on corruption, for instance, outlines three overarching 
elements that have to coexist in order for corruption to be present: (1) someone must 
have discretionary power, (2) there need to be economics rents associated with this 
power, (3) the national legal/judicial system must offer sufficiently low probability of 
detection and/or penalty for the wrongdoing. In other words,  “corruption occurs when 
higher rents are associated with misuse of the discretionary powers, net of any illegal 
payments and penalties associated with such a misuse” (Jain 2001, p.77). This approach 
mirrors Becker’s (1968) approach to the model of ‘crime and punishment’, which 
provides an underlying foundation to the Bowles-Garoupa model used in this essay.  
Current empirical research on economics of corruption primarily addresses the 
question of determinants and consequences. Methodologically, such research is 
frequently scrutinised based on its two common characteristics: (1) it exclusively relies 
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on subjective measures of corruption through surveys and indices of corruption 
perception; (2) corruption data are available only at national level, thus researchers have 
focused on explaining cross-country variations17 (Mocan 2004). Perception-based 
measurement of corruption has numerous critics: Andvig (2005) and Abramo (2005) 
argue that perception-based indices, instead of reflecting the level of corruption, reflect 
the quality of institutions in the country; Bjornskov (2006) finds that Kaufmann et al.’s 
(1999) six indices of governance, which include a measure of perceived corruption, 
cannot be separated statistically and actually measure one underlying factor—level of 
governance; Galtung’s (2005) critical analysis of Corruption Perception Index 
demonstrates that the index is unsuitable to measure short-term trends or even to 
capture genuine reforms. Hence, an econometric analysis using indices over time is not 
sufficiently reliable. When explaining cross-country variations, researchers aggregate 
corruption level by using several indices. However, as Knack (2006) argues regarding 
Eastern Europe and Central Asian region, statistical precision gains from aggregating 
sources of corruption are not very high due to interdependence among data sources. An 
alternative to cross-country variation are micro-level surveys of corruption. Yet despite 
the advantages put forth put by Reinikka and Svenson (2006), any survey where 
respondents are asked about their perception of corruption faces criticism outlined in the 
previous paragraph. In this light, measurement of corruption has been a ‘catch 22’18. 
As for the determinants and consequences of corruption found in empirical 
literature, the following Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary. 
Table 1. Determinants of corruption based on empirical literature 
Determinants Relationship  Literature 
Macro-level 
Level of economic development Negative Treisman (2000) 
Quality of institutions Negative Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) 
Legal system (common law, former British 
colony) 
Negative Treisman (2000) 
Legal system (civil law, socialist state) Positive La Porta et al. (1998) 
Federal structure, fiscal centralisation Unclear Positive: Treisman 
(2000) 
Negative: Fisman and 
                                                 
17 Two exceptions are Swamy et al (2001) and Svensson (2003) 
18 Some interesting alternatives have been developed by Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2007), 
Golden and Picci (2005) 
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Gatti (2002) 
Large endowments of raw materials Positive Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) 
Income inequality Positive You and Khagram 
(2004) 
Micro-level 
Income, composite consumption good (sum 
of earned legal income and illegal income) 
Positive Mocan (2004) 
Gender (male) Positive Mocan and Rees (1999), 
Swamy et al. 2001 
 
 
Table 2. Impact of corruption on indicators based on empirical literature 
Indicator Direction of 
impact  
Literature 
Level of 
development 
Negative Mauro (1995) 
Economic growth Unclear Negative: Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001), Acemoglu, Johnson and Thaicharoen 
(2003) 
No impact: Mocan (2004) 19 
Income inequality 
and poverty 
Positive Positive: Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 
(2002) 
Complex: Li, Xu and Zou (2000) 
Firm inefficiency Positive Dal Bo and Rossi (2007) 
FDI Negative/Unclear Negative: Wei (2000) 
Negative unless there is no change in the 
level of corruption and it is predictable: 
Cartier-Bresson (2000) 
Interpersonal trust Negative Seligson (2008) 
Legitimacy of 
governing regime 
Negative Seligson (2008) 
 
The gap in current literature that this thesis contributes can be seen two-fold: (1) 
combination of theoretical and empirical research in one study, specific to one under-
researched sector; (2) mixed-methodology approach of both qualitative and 
mathematical methods. 
Mathematical models 
Literature that falls under ‘economics of corruption’ often contains 
mathematical models, and there are many. Levin and Tsirik’s (1998) meta-study of 
                                                 
19 Controlling for the quality of institutions, corruption does not have a direct impact of growth 
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corruption as an object of mathematical modelling distinguishes between mathematical 
models of two primary types: (1) study of acts of external corruption, and (2) study of 
how an organisation becomes or is internally corrupted. The authors also classify a third 
dimension of theoretical study, concerning (3) multiple equilibrium outcomes, cyclical 
nature, and persistence of corruption. From a technical perspective, in the case of (1) 
corruption is expressed as a game between actors; as  a principal-agent problem in case 
(2); and in case of (3)—dynamically, looking at time-based changes or lack thereof. 
This thesis work thus clearly falls under the first classification of Levin and Tsirik 
(1998): it is a study of corruption separately from the organisation, modelled using a 
game-theoretic basis. 
Rose-Ackerman (1975) and Macrae (1982) are main two scholars whose 
modelling work on corruption forms the theoretical basis for expressing corrupt 
interaction mathematically and using the game-theory basis. Rose-Ackerman (1975) has 
pioneered economics of corruption where profit incentives are defined mathematically 
and utility is maximised, by looking at public procurement corruption scenarios. In this 
model, gain to public official and profit to seller are expressed and analysed with 
presence of bribes to secure the contract, under three different circumstances related to 
government project specifications and number of firms competing.  
Furthermore, Macrae (1982) has used game-theoretic modelling for public 
procurement bribery scenarios to demonstrate ‘why does a decision to be corrupt occur 
in the first place?’—because it is a dominant strategy. The pitfalls of a utility-
maximising approach have been first recognised by Beenstock (1979, p.21), who noted 
the need for a game-theoretic approach to answer questions of bargaining dynamics, 
which the expected utility-maximising approach is unable to deal with. Macrae’s (1982) 
explanation of the merit from a game-theoretic approach is particularly insightful: 
“The utility-maximising approach attempts to answer the 
first question by postulating a corruptibility condition 
which must be satisfied if a corrupt decision is to be 
possible. However, the specification of such a condition is 
incomplete. It does not incorporate the likely gains under 
the alternative assumptions—corrupt or not corrupt—nor, 
for each of these cases, varying assumptions about rival 
behaviour which will, surely influence a decision to make 
or take bribes. It is for dealing with such situations where 
anticipation of rival strategies is important that game 
theory is particularly suited” (p.680) 
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Looking at specific game-theory based interactions between two players, several 
models involving a polluting plant and corruptible inspector (like Moohkerjee and Png 
(1995) and Mishra (2006) models) share similarities with the scenario between a driver 
who is stopped for violation traffic rules and a traffic policeman. In Mishra’s (2006) 
model of inspector-polluting plant interaction, the sequence of events and decisions is 
the following two-stage game20: 
Stage 1: Each firm chooses whether to pollute or not, each 
officer chooses the level of enforcement effort. 
Stage 2: “A simple bribe game—if  the officer and the 
firm agree on a bribe (including a bribe of zero), the firm 
is not reported. Otherwise, the firm is reported. The firms 
and the officer work out the expected payoffs in this 
stage” (p.352) 
 
Varying several of the model variables, such as the level of effort, leads to resulting two 
types of enforcers—informed or uninformed—and Mishra (2006) uses this distinction 
to check for implications and arrive at two possible equilibria, high compliance and low 
compliance, as the analytical conclusion.  
With reference to police, I have come across two works with mathematical 
models, Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and it’s further adaptation by Chang, Lai and Yang 
(2000). Bowles and Garoupa (1997) extend Becker’s (1968) standard economic model 
of crime by incorporating collusion between police officer and offender in the form of a 
bribe. The basic set-up of the model follows in Figure 8, with the following variables: 
p is probability of detection of a criminal; q is probability of detection of corrupt police 
officer conditional on the fact that s/he has been bribed by a detected criminal; F is the 
fine imposed on convicted criminal; S is the fine imposed on corrupt police officer; b is 
the prospective gain from crime; R is the size of the bribe; r is probability of successful 
bribe, conditional on a criminal being detected; v is the policeman’s cost of being 
corrupted. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The game is similarly set up in Mookherjee and Png (1995) as well 
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Figure 6. Basic set-up of the Bowles-Garoupa model 
Prospective Criminal’s Decision The Police Officer’s Decision 
Each citizen contemplating a crime 
confronts three possible states of the 
world: 
The police officer detects a crime and 
makes a decision about whether to offer 
the criminal immunity from prosecution in 
return for a bribe. If corrupted, a risk-
neutral officer faces two possible states of 
the world: 
a. the crime is not detected, with 
probability 1-p; income from crime is b 
b. the crime is detected and the citizen 
does not a bribe, with probability p (1-r); 
Income is b-F 
a. the corruption is not detected, with 
probability 1-q, in which income is R 
c. the crime is detected and the citizen 
pays a bribe, with probability pr. Income 
is b-R-qF. 
b. the corruption is detected, with 
probability q, in which case income is R-
S-v 
Risk-neutral criminal compares the returns 
and costs from crime and decides to 
commit crime if it offers positive return. 
His/her expected utility is greater than the 
alternative income of zero if: 
(1-p)b + p(1-r)(b-F) + pr (b-R-qF) > 0 
b > p[(1-r) + rq]F + pR 
If not corrupted, the officer received an 
alternative income of zero. His/her 
expected utility is greater than the 
alternative income of zero if: 
(1-q)R + q(R-S-v) > 0  
R > qS + qv 
Source: Bowles and Garoupa (1997) pp.77-79 
Proceeding from this set-up, Bowles and Garoupa find the equation for an 
equilibrium bribe based on the Nash bargain solution—where the officer and the 
criminal bargain in a static setting over how to split the rent created by the arrangement 
and consequently determine the size of the bribe R. Substituting the equilibrium R into 
prospective driver’s decision, Bowles and Garoupa reach similar conclusions to 
Becker’s economic model of crime, plus findings that: corruption weakens deterrence; 
anticorruption moves through increasing probability of detection of corruption and 
increasing the punishment on police officers are never counterproductive. Substituting 
the equilibrium R into officer’s decision, Bowles and Garoupa also find the probability 
of a particular officer being corrupt, and come to a conclusion that a higher fine may 
deter crime but encourages corruption. Thus, Bowles-Garoupa model shows that 
increasing the fine is no longer an optimal deterrent in the presence of corruption.  
This Bowles-Gaoupa model is augmented by Chang, Lai and Yang (2000) 
through incorporation of social norms as psychological costs onto the corrupt officer. 
Interpreting Bowles-Garoupa’s v term as psychological costs, related to social norms, 
results in: 
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v = ϵ · Z = ϵ (1-r)δ;  0 ≤  δ ≤ 1. 
“Where ϵ is an officer’s subjective personal taste (or 
sensitivity indicator), and Z (=(1-r)δ) represents the 
objective social sanction stemming from being a caught 
corrupt officer...with δ representing the degree of social 
sanction or pressure from the police officer 
community....Here, the psychological costs inflicted on an 
individual caught officer depend not only on his own 
view of the code of honor (i.e., ϵ), but also on the portion 
of the police population adhering to the norm (i.e., 1-r)” 
(Chang, Lai and Yang 2000, p.38) 
 
Substituting the equilibrium bribe into officer’s decision, Chang, Lai and Yang (2000) 
find the critical ϵ* that makes an officer just indifferent between taking a bribe and not. 
Further, the authors use this to demonstrate presence of two equillibria: one unstable 
where widespread corruption becomes a social norm as r approaches 1; one stable 
where corruption is very low. In case where corruption density of officers is somewhere 
between the two equilibrium points, an officer is less likely to be corrupt if there exist 
enough other who do not choose to be corrupt either and at the same time an officer is 
likely to be corrupt if there exist enough others who are corrupt, i.e., a “conditional 
cooperation”(p.41). This demonstrates how two similar countries may end up with very 
different levels of corruption. Chang, Lai and Yang (2000) use this analysis of multiple 
equilibria to take the Bowles-Garoupa result further, by showing that raising fines could 
actually be counter-productive in deterring crimes, and not just ineffective, if status quo 
corruption is widespread.   
The Bowles-Garoupa and the Chalg-Lai-Yang models—showing the economics 
of crime—represent the significant basis for modelling traffic police bribery. In the 
model presented in Chapter II, the crime aspect is removed from the analysis and 
additional variables are incorporated based on the insights from in-depth interviews 
with several drivers and traffic policemen in transition countries, including a total of 
forty-two real cases of driver-officer interactions. Where in Mookherjee and Png (1995) 
and Mishra’s (2006) models it was assumed that “if [actors] agree..., then...”, the two 
models of this thesis make instances of agreement between the driver and traffic 
policeman, or lack of agreement, endogenous to the model, not exogenous. This 
represents an additional theoretical contribution to game-theoretic modelling.  
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Police corruption in post-communist societies 
 It is also useful to look at criminology, political science and trust literature on 
police corruption in post-communist societies. Although this thesis is not meant to fully 
address the institutional measures of police reform, several insights can be drawn from 
this literature that are directly applicable to this study. First, because post-communist 
societies have inherited a highly centralized, politicized and militarized police force, 
with a history of repression, traffic policeman has a greater position of power than in 
societies that are not post-communist; this can be applied as a greater bargaining power 
to policeman in his/her interaction with a driver. Second, lack of trust can be translated 
as drivers being more likely self-interested and rational. A driver who does not trust, 
does not respect, or in some sense abhores a traffic policeman, is more likely to act 
using instrumental rationality rather than having an irrational logic like altruism. Hence, 
lack of police trustworthiness in post-communist societies provides additional support 
of using rationality-based modelling and portraying the interaction as a game of self-
interested actors. 
During the Soviet Union, argue Caparini and Marenin (2005), policing was 
ideologically framed; exercising control and coercion was a means to an end. With 
time, the Soviet-style militia evolved from a militarised body used to counter opposition 
to a law enforcement body with the goal of public order, the organisation remained 
highly authoritarian and closely tied to the part-state. Meanwhile in Western 
democracies, policing underwent liberalisation; currently, transition countries are in 
need of democratic policing, which includes: the focus on service to civic society rather 
than service to the state, transparency and accountability, representativeness of 
population characteristics in police personnel, integrity management, semi-autonomous 
status of police organisations, high professionalism, efficient and effective job 
performance. (Caparini and Marenin 2005, pp.2-4) 
As a whole, post-socialist republics of Central and Eastern Europe exhibit high 
levels of fear of crime and feelings of insecurity; the public continues to perceive the 
police as “corrupt or as serving the interests of the state or private interests rather than 
those of the community” (Krajewski 2005 p.5). In Russia, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Yugoslavia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Georgia, the public perceives 
police as the public officials most frequently involved in corruption (Caparini and 
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Marenin 2005 p.6). Althout some post-socialist states have made significant progress 
towards accountable and legitimate police—GDR, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovenia—in many other Soviet successor states, police organisations 
continue to demonstrate authoritarian tendencies and remain militarised, centralised, 
and politicised. (Caparini and Marenin, 2005, p.8 and Beck, 2005). Despite 
declarations, slogans of reform and signing of international conventions are 
commonplace, real change is slow. 
The starting point in developing and post-authoritarian countries, Goldsmith 
(2005) argues, is the absence of public trust in police. The police’s historical role, 
structural relationships, degree of effectiveness and repertoire of practices in dealing 
with ordinary people (technologies and attitudes and dispositions by police) play a large 
part in explaining the deficit of trust. Trust-diminishing behaviour of police includes 
neglect, indifference, incompetence, venality (petty corruption), extortion, 
discrimination, inconsistency, intimidation, excessive force, brutality; the practice 
among police officers of seeking small bribes or favours is commonplace in low-trust 
societies (Goldsmith, 2005). While this practice of petty corruption can be seen as a 
simple transaction cost on one hand, on the other hand, when the public associates 
police service with capacity to pay, this undermines the trustworthiness of police as an 
institution. Citizens become and remain critical of the policemen’s motives for entering 
the police service, and do not expect high standard of service. Hence, the problem of 
trust and petty corruption can be seen as self-reinforcing vicious circle of post-
communist societies, and ties to high rationality behind the players’ decisions’ within 
game-theoretic framework.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
In this thesis, a model is developed and tested, hence this thesis is both 
theoretical and empirical. Two types of methods are used: qualitative and mathematical. 
In-depth interviews used for the insights into the models, and the case studies used as an 
empirical application of the model, are part of qualitative research. Three game-
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theoretic models are part of mathematical modelling research. I combine two methods 
because a single-methodology analysis of anti-corruption programmes would not be as 
robust. Mixed-methodology allows for triangulation, i.e., testing the consistency of 
finding obtained through different instruments. A combination of methodology also 
allows for complementarity, thus clarifying and illustrating results from one method 
with the use of another method. In the development process, the results from one 
method shape subsequent methods or steps in the research process, thus stimulating new 
research questions or challenges obtained through one method, i.e., initiation. Lastly, 
combination of several methods allows for expansion via richness and detail to the 
study. In this section, I briefly discuss several aspects of qualitative and mathematical 
methodology. 
Interviews were conducted with six drivers and three traffic policemen, thus a 
total of nine respondents. The respondents were identified through family or friends’ 
connections, which pre-established a basic amount of trust and towards the interviewer 
and confidence in lack of malicious intentions. Interview respondents were evenly 
distributed across personal characteristics, such as age, income bracket, gender; four 
respondents were Georgian, four respondents were Ukrainian and one was Russian. I 
also used the snow-balling effect to extend the interviews to the family and friends of 
the respondent question, this way increasing the sample to include as many observations 
as possible. 
Procedurally, the in-depth interviews were conducted in person, over the 
telephone or via internet using Skype, in a semi-structured manner, in Russian or 
Ukrainian language. Only in one instance, a former Georgian traffic policeman asked to 
participate in the interview without any technology involved, and in this case, his/her 
answers were recorded on paper and transcribed into an electronic format by author’s 
friend in Georgia2122. Before commencing the interview, I always provided the 
interviewees with the following information about the research purpose, interview 
process, anonymity considerations and their rights, thus taking account ethical 
considerations: 
                                                 
21 In this instance, the friend was provided with detailed instructions of the interview scope, question-
techniques, and issues of trust-building and ethical considerations, in order to keep this interview 
procedure as close to the other ones as possible. 
22 This interview took place in Georgian. 
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“The aim of this research is to better understand the determinants 
of traffic police bribery in a country like (name here). In other 
words, what factors influence the decision of a driver/policeman 
to offer/ask for, or to give/accept a bribe. The interview is meant 
to be semi-structured, so besides answering the basic question, 
feel free to provide additional relevant information, explanations 
of the context, or your personal opinion. You may abstain from 
participation in the research and have the right to stop the 
interview at any time. Your replies will be kept confidential. 
Neither your first name, nor your last name, will be used in the 
final version of the research.” 
 
The detailed topic guide for the interviews can be found in Appendix 2, but the 
key result of the interviews were real stories of respondents’ past interaction in a driver-
policeman setting. A sample question for the driver was worded in the following 
manner: “Do you recall the very first time you were stopped by a traffic policeman? 
Please tell me when was it and what happened, step by step.” For the policeman: 
“Please describe the last time you stopped a driver: what did you say and do, what did 
the driver say and do, how the interaction took place, and how the situation ended.” 
Thus, none of the questions directly asked “Did you give or receive a bribe?”. 
Following basic stories, I asked follow-up questions about the factors that affected the 
respondent’s decision to act a certain way and not another in that particular situation 
that s/he described. I also asked about general determinants of behaviour across all 
driver-policeman settings. Basic characteristics of the respondents (age, gender, 
education, region) were also collected. Both drivers and policemen provided an average 
of five stories each; even when there was potential for more cases, I attempted to keep 
the interview to the one-hour limit in order to give each respondent equal weight. The 
exceptions were the three interviews with traffic policemen, particularly for questions 
involving context of their decision-making. 
Unlike numerous surveys on corruption which ask regarding attitudes towards 
corrupt behaviour, or subjective perception of corruption, the explicit advantage of 
these in-depth interviews is gathering detailed cases of real driver-policeman 
interactions that actually took place—those that involved an official fine, traffic 
policeman letting go of the driver, or payment of a bribe to overlook enforcement of a 
traffic violation. Clear shortcomings is the small sample (total of 10 respondents); non-
balanced sample (more drivers than traffic policemen); respondent bias (the respondents 
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who agreed to talk about bribery could be morally biased either against corruption or in 
terms of active practice23). However, for a secretive topic, a small, non-balanced sample 
is better than no sample at all; the alternative would be mathematical modelling based 
only on author’s subjective perception of traffic police bribery and limited experience 
with it. Given that the number of drivers in society outweighs the number of traffic 
policemen, the imbalance in the sample is acceptable. Moreover, the subject of 
corruption, no matter how petty or frequent, is still sensitive; police respondents showed 
a lack of desire to discuss the topic of bribery with reference to their personal actions. 
Hence, finding 3 traffic policemen to conduct an interview with involved maximum 
possible effort, taking into account time limitations, and the fact that I lived in 
Estonia—a country without a substantial level of traffic police bribery—and therefore 
had to rely on friends and relatives to seek out the respondents for me. 
In order to test the quality of the model, I undertook two in-depth case studies of 
both successful and unsuccessful anti-corruption programmes aimed at reforming traffic 
police in transition countries. For case study selection, I relied on information-oriented 
sampling, as opposed to random sampling. The purpose of the case study is to reveal 
insights, and the statistically average case is often not the richest in information. I 
consider the successful programme in Georgia vis-a-vis the unsuccessful programme in 
Ukraine. In both cases, concrete anti-corruption reforms in the traffic police were 
implemented, but the impact of these reforms on the level of corruption was different. 
Issues of informational availability and accessibility (language barrier) are also taken 
into account. 
Georgia represents an extreme case in that the reform measures were so 
harsh/drastic, and the outcome successful. An average statistical case involved slow-
paced reforms, with not nearly as drastic measures. Availability of information is 
relatively high, given widespread publicity of the successful reform, and therefore lack 
of Georgian language fluency and lack of Georgian-language sources is not a significant 
problem. Ukraine represents a good case for comparison in that the reform measures 
were also harsh/drastic, but ultimately affecting different determinants—the 
determinants that were not significantly affected in the Georgian case. Availability of 
                                                 
23 The seven respondents so far showed a spectrum of opinion, from active practice to passive bribery; 
though none thought is was immoral and therefore never did it. 
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information is relatively high because of use of Ukrainian and Russian language sources 
(otherwise it would have been a problem).  
The data for the case studies came from both official, academic, news, media 
and unofficial sources. Official sources include legislative documents, news articles on 
the ministries’ websites, as well as speeches or public interviews with officials involved 
with the reform. Academic sources include print and electronic publications; news 
sources include the national and international media; media sources refer to internet 
videos of traffic police reform, while unofficial sources refer to blogs, anonymous 
comments on news articles, and forums relating the issues of traffic police reform and 
bribery level. For the case of Ukraine, the sources in the original language are heavily 
used (both Russian and Ukrainian), except for some academic and official publications 
in English, or Russian-language sources from Russia. For the case of Georgia, the 
proportion of official and unofficial sources in English is substantial, but for purposes of 
similarity, one Georgian-language source has been translated using an on-line 
dictionary24, and several Russian-language sources are used as well. 
I do not use the data acquired from in-depth interviews for case studies, as 
evidence of change or lack of change resulting from anti-corruption reforms. Testing 
the model with the data that was used to generate the model in the first place would lead 
to ‘endogeneity’ bias of sorts and would not be appropriate. 
 
                                                 
24 This refers to Ministry of Internal Affairs (2006) 
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CHAPTER II. GAME-THEORETIC MODELS 
 
In this chapter, the three models are set-up, developed and analysed. First, 
insights from interviews are presented in the form of additional insights; the structured 
summaries of the interview transcripts can be found in Appendix 3. Second, Bowles-
Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang models are augmented with these variables and analysed 
to find the condition for a no-corruption equilibrium. Third, a key assumption of 
Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang model is challenged (that whenever there is 
positive rent to be gained, both players will always agree), and two models are derived 
where agreement is endogenised. The two models—one where a driver has a bargaining 
advantage and one where a police officer has a bargaining advantage—are presented 
and analysed. Lastly, the findings and respective anti-corruption tools from the three 
models are compared.  
 
 
Insights from Interviews 
  
Structured summaries of all interviews can be found in Appendix 3, including 
forty-two real cases of driver-traffic policeman interactions as well as quotes related to 
incentives, factors, insights, and environment in general that influences the respondent 
to act one way or another. In the following section, reference ‘D1, Case 1.4’ denotes 
driver respondent number one, case number four in Appendix 3; similarly P1 denotes 
police respondent number one. This section outlines basic findings about the interaction 
process (including the signal, bargaining), and various factors that influence both the 
driver and the traffic policeman, according to the interview respondents. References to 
the cases and statements in Appendix 3 are included below. 
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 In the interaction process, there is often a sign on behalf of either police officer 
or the driver used to indicate that s/he could also consider a bribe instead of official 
fine. Typical phrases are “maybe we will think of some solution” “should we solve this 
problem differently?” used by both driver and traffic policeman (P1 statement 6); “what 
will we do about this, Mr...?” used by both (D3 cases 3.2 and 3.3, D6 case 6.3); “I could 
pay the fine for you myself” on behalf of the police officer (D4 statement 2). Additional 
signals could be frequent reiteration of the magnitude of the official fine, purposefully 
inflating the amount of the fine in order to scare the driver into a briber (D6 case 6.2), or 
straightforward asking—to give a specific amount instead of the fine (D2 case 2.2 and 
D1 case 1.3), by drivers and policemen alike. Simple presence of a signal does not 
actually indicate the other player understands it as such (D6 case 6.3). Altogether, it was 
not possible to determine with certainty whether usually the driver signals first, or the 
traffic policeman. Hence, certain conclusion about who is the first actor when the game 
is sequential cannot be achieved, and both sequential and simultaneous game-theoretic 
models should be used for modelling this interaction. 
 Bargaining over the size of the bribe sometimes takes place (D2 case, D4 
statement 1, and D1 case 1.5), where the policeman’s objective is to get a higher bribe, 
while the driver’s objective is to give the least amount possible as a bribe. The 
bargaining outcome frequently depends on how well the driver articulates his/her 
situation, how much cash has in the wallet, how expensive the driver’s car is25, etc, 
which can be translated as different bargaining powers in different cases (P2 statement 
8). This provides support to use Nash bargaining as do Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-
Lai-Yang models. 
 As for the determinants of bribery, the classical preventative factors like 
probability of detection and penalty indeed play a significant role. For instance, every 
time driver respondent no.2 recorded the interaction with a camera, the outcome was 
always formal protocol of violation of traffic rules (D2 statement 4). Low probability of 
detection 1-10% (P1 statement 1, P2 statement 9, P3 statement 6) solidifies the financial 
incentives to accept a bribe. Flexibility of penalty depending on policeman’s 
connections within the department (P1 statement 1) provides possibilities for bribery 
with insignificant punishment and did not act as a strong deterrent. Lack of penalty for 
                                                 
25 This is also sometimes a signal about wealth, which can indicate the bargaining position of the driver 
with respect to income and financial considerations. 
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the bribe-giving driver encourages the drivers to give bribes (D3 statement 7 and D5 
statement 4). 
 Salary and other financial considerations turned out to be significantly stronger 
factors than Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang models portray. Low salary that is 
insufficient for decent living is the key motivating factor to make additional income in 
the form of bribes (P1 statement 3, P2 statements 13 and 11 and P3 statement 5). If in 
practice, traffic police are not given any—or sufficient—funds to pay for patrol car’s 
fuel, maintenance and cleaning, additional informal income needs to cover at least that 
much. Before the fines were increased and when the revenue from bribes was relatively 
low in Ukraine, the majority of the money a low-level traffic policeman got was spent 
on lunches, coffee, gas, and so forth, with maximum 20% of daily revenue left over, 
which was split between partners at the end of the day (P1 statement 3). On the driver 
side, financial factors—paying less than the fine—are strong motivating factors (D3 
case 3.3 and statement 4, D5 statement 3). For a driver, a low-value single bill like 10 
lari or 50 UAH is a small amount to worry about (D1 statements 1 and 5, D3 case 3.3). 
This insight provides substantial support to normalising the actors’ payoffs to monthly 
salary, hence looking at relative payoffs, not grand payoffs. 
 For the driver, the most important factor behind usefulness of bribery is saving 
time, directly on the road: it takes 20-30 minutes to write out a formal protocol of 
violation, in rare cases up to 45 minutes, plus the additional 30 minutes to wait in a 
queue in a bank to for a fine (D1 cases 1.2 and 1.4, D2 case 2.1 and so forth). Instead, 
bribing takes 5-10 minutes (D2 case 2.3 and statement 3, D3 case 3.2, D6 case 6.2, D1 
case 1.3, P2 case 2.3). Interview cases demonstrated that every time a driver is in a rush, 
he/she will be prone to attempt bribery; the long time it takes to write out the protocol is 
primarily because formal procedures are complex: 4 documents to transcribe 
information from by hand, 2 copies of the final protocol (P1 statement 5). The 
motivating factor of saving time also applies to unintended repercussions and hassle as 
a result of an official fine, either as the long time it takes to pay for the fine or another 
issue that arises as a result of the fine, related to car inspection, insurance, and so forth 
(D3 case 3.5). Specifically, several drivers noted that the easier it is to pay a fine—
online, at the bank if there are no queues and no paperwork—the less incentive there is 
to bribe (D4 statement 6 and D5 case 5.7 and statement 8). This insight from interviews 
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supports the addition of time variable, linked to actor’s per hour salary, as a motivating 
factor. 
 For traffic policemen, presence of unofficial performance requirements (referred 
to as ‘quotas’) is a substantial factor that has not been included in Bowles-Garoupa and 
Chang-Lai-Yang models. If an officer has to write a minimum of one protocol of a 
serious violation during the shift as a proof of work (P3 statement 9, P2 statement 12, 
P1 statement 2), in case where officer stops the violator at the beginning of the shift, 
he/she will be highly inclined to take a bribe, whereas in case where officer stops a 
violator at the end of a slow shift, the officer will not be taking bribe, because he/she 
needs to fill the quota (D2 statement 7). Similarly, in case the ‘acceptable work’ quota 
is slightly higher (P2 statement 12). This insight from interviews also supports the 
addition of a quota variable, linked to policeman’s official salary, as a motivating factor. 
 Furthermore, the level of legal education and acumen of the driver influences 
his/her decision (D3 case 3.2, D6 case 6.7, D2 case 2.1 and statements 4 and 5). Drivers 
with legal education or good knowledge of own rights and how the judiciary system 
works, are less likely to offer bribes if there is no sufficient evidence and can anticipate 
that the final fine will not be levied (D2). On the other hand, if the violation is serious 
and the driver has no case to present to the court, then the driver is ready to pay a bribe 
to decrease the overall cost (D2 statement 2). In the opposite scenario, when the laws 
change frequently and the driver is uninformed about the latest rules of the road, such 
driver is more susceptible to extortive bribery (D3 case 3.3). Based on this insight, the 
models that follow include this differentiation via difference in bargaining power of 
traffic police officer and driver. Lastly, human factors and special circumstances also 
alter the bargaining power to an actor’s advantage or a disadvantage, which include 
articulating an extenuating personal circumstance like first time driving or coming back 
from a wedding, being a pregnant woman, having a child in the back of the car, being 
an important person, and so forth (D2 case 2.4, D5 case 5.2, D6 case 6.5 and P2 case 
2.2). 
 Interviews also highlighted the importance of past experience, word of mouth 
and common knowledge about the level of bribery and perceived actions of other 
drivers influencing both drivers’ and traffic officers’ decisions regarding bribery (D3 
statement 1, D5 statement 9, D6 case 6.2, P2 statement 14, D1 statement 4 and case 
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1.1). Incorporating this insight would require dynamic modelling and is beyond the 
practical scope of this study, but presents a potential for further study, as with 
evolutionary game theory, for instance. 
 
 
Exogenous Agreement Model 
 
In this section, Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang models are augmented with 
several variables and analysed to find the condition for a no-corruption equilibrium. 
Set-up 
In the basic set-up, the driver is stopped by policeman, regardless of whether 
they actually violated traffic laws or not. The additions to the Bowles-Garoupa and the 
Chang-Lai-Yang-Lai models include: 
• Salaries (i.e., net payoff relative to the salary) 
• Driver’s time spent during and as a result of being stopped (both the time spent 
during issuance of ticket and paying the fine afterwards and the time spent 
paying for the bribe) 
• Quotas for policemen (number of violators to be caught per month) 
• Penalty on the driver for bribing, if corruption is discovered 
The following diagram illustrates the two-stage game between the driver and the traffic 
policeman. In the diagram, r denotes the probability of bribery taking place and q 
denotes the probability of bribery being detected. Similarly, 1-r is the probability that 
bribery does not take place, and 1-q is the probability that bribery is not detected. 
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Figure 7. Temporal representation of the model 
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In the case where bribery does not take place, the driver pays the fine, and 
his/her relative payoff that includes the cost of the time spent is: 
D1-r = 
– –   
where F is the fine for the traffic violation, t1 is the time the interaction takes (number 
of hours), and m is the driver’s hourly salary. The payoff is normalized to driver’s 
monthly salary, M, in order to denote the net value. The traffic policeman’s payoff in 
this case is determined as the value of the ticket in terms of the quota (N/v), where N is 
the policeman’s monthly salary, and v is the minimum monthly quota (number of 
drivers to catch in a month). When the payoff is normalized to the policeman’s monthly 
salary it simplifies to: 
P1-r =  
	
   =   
The relative value of policeman’s payoff is a share that this ticket represents among all 
the tickets required from the policeman in a month. In case where policeman is not 
subject to a quota, policeman’s payoff P1-r  is equal to 0, as the policeman receives no 
material incentive for each legally-processed fine. I do not include the cost of the time 
Traffic 
policeman 
stops the 
driver 
Bribery does not take place. Traffic policeman 
follows formal procedure for issuing the ticket. 
Bribery takes place
Bribery is detected 
Bribery is not detected 
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spent in policeman’s equation because that is policeman’s remunerated job; this is 
contrary to a driver, where the time spent on being stopped by the policeman represents 
foregone income. 
In the case where bribery takes place and is not detected, the driver pays 
policeman a bribe, and his/her net payoff that includes the cost of the time spent is : 
Dr(1-q) = 
– –    
where R is the bribe e, t2 is the time the corrupt interaction takes (number of hours), and 
m is the driver’s hourly salary. The payoff is similarly normalized to driver’s monthly 
salary, M, in order to denote the relative value. Traffic policeman’s payoff is the value 
of the bribe relative to his/her monthly salary, N: 
Pr(1-q) =  

 
 In the case where bribery takes place and then is detected, in addition to Dr(1-q) 
the driver has to also pay the original fine F, an additional penalty imposed on the 
driver for bribery T (if it exists). Driver’s payoff is therefore: 
Drq =  
 – –  –  – ( )   
where t1+ t2 is the time originally spent on bribing and then on paying the fine post 
detection, m is the driver’s hourly income rate, and the payoff is similarly standardized 
to the driver’s monthly salary M.  
The policeman’s payoff, Prq, in addition to Pr(1-q), includes the penalty imposed 
on the policeman for bribery S, as well as the psychological costs denoted by ϵ Z, 
following the Chang-Lai-Yang model (2000): 
Prq = 
 –  –  
  
I also26 assume that the policeman does not have to return the bribe originally received. 
The psychological cost of corruption is two-fold: ϵ represents the officer’s subjective 
personal taste regarding bribery, while Z stands for the objective social sanction from 
being caught as corrupt. In other words, Z is the degree to which corruption is accepted 
in the society, and 
                                                 
26 Bowles and Garoupa (1995) follow similar logic. 
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Z = (1-r)δ 
where 1-r is the proportion of non-
corrupt officers in the total population 
and δ is the degree of social sanction or 
pressure from the police officer 
community, as in the Chang-Lai-Yang 
model. 
Hence, when the driver is stopped 
by the traffic policeman, he faces two 
options: 
i. Corruption does not take place. 
Driver has to pay a fine.  
Payoff: D1-r = 
– –   
ii. Corruption takes place, with the 
possibility of getting caught.  
Payoff: Dr = Dr(1-q) (1-q) + Drq (q) = 
 –  –  (1-q) +  –  –  –  – ( ) (q) = –  –      –  –  –  – ( )   = 
 –  –  –  –  –   
The driver will be prone to corruption (to bargain over a bribe with the traffic 
police officer) if the payoff from the corrupt scenario is greater than the payoff from the 
non-corrupt scenario27, i.e., if Dr > D1-r: –  –  –  –  –   > – –   – R – t2m – qF – qT – qt1m > –F – t1m (R + t2m + qF + qT + qt1m )(-1) > (F + t1m)(-1) 
                                                 
27 Since the payoffs are negative values for the driver, in more intuitive terms, the driver will be prone to 
corruption if it is cheaper to pay the policeman off. Meaning, that if the loss from corrupt scenario is less 
than the loss from non-corrupt scenario, i.e. if |Pr| < |P1-r| or Dr > D1-r.  
Figure 8. Variables of the model 
q = probability of corruption being 
detected (a leak) 
F = fine imposed for the traffic violation 
S = fine imposed for corruption on the 
police officer 
T = fine imposed for corruption on the 
driver (if none, =0) 
R = bribe 
r = probability of bribery taking place  
ϵ = officer’s subjective personal taste 
regarding bribery 
Z = (1-r)δ = objective social sanction 
from being caught a corrupt officer 
M = driver’s monthly salary 
m = driver’s hourly salary 
N = traffic officer’s monthly salary 
t1 = time it takes for issuance of a ticket, 
and payment for it 
t2 = time it takes to negotiate and pay a 
bribe 
v = monthly quota of how many tickets 
to write 
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R + t2m + qF + qT + qt1m < F + t1m 
Equation 1. The driver is prone to corruption     (1) R < F + (t1 –t2)m – q(F + T + t1m) 
Hence, the driver will be prone to corruption if the size of the bribe is less than fine and 
the associated time savings less the potential losses if caught. 
 The police officer faces two options when s/he stops a driver: 
i. Corruption does not take place. Driver pays a fine and the officer records it towards 
the quota.  
Payoff: P1-r=  
 
ii. Corruption takes place. Officer does not issue a formal ticket and does not record 
the violation towards the quota, with the possibility of getting caught. 
Payoff: Pr = Pr(1-q) (1-q) + Prq (q)  
 (1-q) +   –  –  
  (q)=  –    –  &   
  =  R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N  
 
Police officer will prefer for bribery to take place and will engage in bargaining if 
payoff from the corrupt scenario is greater than payoff from the non-corrupt scenario, 
i.e, if Pr > P1-r  – (  )
  >  
 >   + (  )
  
R >[  + (  )
  ] * N 
Equation 2. Police officer is prone to corruption     (2) 
R > 
  + q (S+ ϵ Z) 
Policeman will be prone to bribery is the amount of the bribe is more than income 
forgone registering towards a quota and income savings should the police officer be 
caught. 
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 Both the driver and police officer will be prone to bargaining if (1) and if (2) are 
simultaneous: 
.R <  F +  (t – t/)m –  q(F + T + tm)R >  Nv  +  q (S +  ϵ Z) 1 
hence, both parties will be prone to corruption if the size of the bribe falls within the 
following interval: 
Equation 3. Both parties are prone to corruption      (3) 
  + q (S + ϵ Z) < R < F + (t1 – t2)m – q(F + T + t1m) 
Bargaining 
When both the traffic policeman and the driver are better off should they agree 
on a bribe, there is a positive rent created as a result of corrupt interaction. The size of 
the bribe, R, will therefore be the outcome of the players’ bargaining over how to divide 
the rent among them. Following Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang models, this 
situation represents a Nash bargaining game, used to model bargaining interactions. In 
the Nash bargaining game, “two players must split one unit of a desirable good and that 
if they fail to reach agreement, neither receives anything...” (Osborne, 2004, p.481). If d 
is the payoff function of the driver and p is the payoff function of the policeman, the 
two players will seek to maximise  |d(x) − d(0)|β * |p(y) − v(0)|(1-β) 
where d(0) and p(0), are the status quo payoffs, obtained  if the player decides not to 
bargain with the other player; β is driver’s bargaining power, 0 < β < 1 and 1-β is the 
traffic policeman’s bargaining power (Osborne, 2004, pp.486-488). The maximisation 
solution, therefore, will be: (1-β) [d(x) − d(0)] = β [p(y) − v(0)] 
Hence, the product, also referred to as the Nash product, is (Dr – D1-r) β *(Pr – P1-r) (1-β): (– –  –  –  –  − – –  ) β * (R – q(S+ ϵ Z)N − 1v) (1-β) (–  (&) –   (& & ) ) β *(R – q(S+ ϵ Z)N − 1v) (1-β) 
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The Nash bargaining solution is28: 
(1 − β) ;– R +  (1 − q)F –  qT + (t −  t/ −  qt)mM = = (β)(R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N − 1v) 
Solved for R: 
R =  N(1– β)[(1 − q)F –  qT + (t − t/ − qt)m] + Mβq(S + >?)N + β(M − N) − MNβv[N + β(M − N)] 
 
Even though driver’s salary is not a factor that influences the outcome of the 
driver-policeman interaction, all the factors—including driver’s salary—influence the 
size of the bribe as a result of bargaining. It is noteworthy from this equation that higher 
fine F, penalty imposed on the driver, and greater time difference between officially 
processing a ticket and paying a bribe, lead to a higher bribe size. A higher penalty 
imposed on the traffic policeman leads to a lower equilibrium bribe size. An increase in 
unofficial quota requirements v, imposed on the traffic policeman, leads to an increase 
in the bribe size29. 
No-corruption equilibrium 
Conversely to (1), (2), and the joint (3), both parties will not even consider 
bargaining for a bribe—will end up in a no-corruption equilibrium of the game—if: 
.R >  F +  (t – t/)m –  q(F + T + tm)R <  Nv  +  q (S +  ϵ Z) 1 
This is the point where the equilibrium bribe size is too large for the driver to offer and 
too small for the traffic police officer to take, i.e. when the size of the bribe falls in the 
following interval:  
F + (t1 –t2)m – q(F + T + t1m) < R <  
  + q (S + ϵ Z) 
which can be re-arranged to: 
Equation 4. Both parties are not prone to corruption    (4) 
(1-q)F – qT + (t1 – t2 – qt1)m < R <  
  + q (S+ ϵ Z)  
                                                 
28 Calculation shortcut based on Osborne (2004, pp.486-488). 
29 Increasing v decreases the second fraction since v is in the denominator; a decreased second fraction 
increases the overall right hand side. 
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Therefore, an anti-corruption initiative aimed at curbing traffic police bribery should 
(separately or simultaneously) increase  

  + q (S+ ϵ Z) and decrease (1-q)F – qT + (t1 – t2 – qt1)m. The following table illustrates how this could be achieved by impacting 
individual variables. 
Table 3. Anti-Corruption tools of the exogenous agreement model 
Code Variable Affecting Change with an 
anti-corruption 
impact 
Level of 
effectiveness 
N Salary of the traffic 
policeman 
Traffic 
policeman 
Increase High30 
v Monthly quota how 
many tickets to write 
Traffic 
policeman 
Inconclusive  
S Penalty  for taking a 
bribe 
Traffic 
policeman 
Increase Low31 
q Probability of 
detection of traffic 
police bribery 
Traffic 
policeman and 
driver 
Increase High 
F Fine for traffic 
violation 
Driver Decrease Medium-high32 
T Penalty for giving a 
bribe 
Driver Increase Low33 
t1 Time for issuance 
and payment of a 
ticket 
Driver Decrease High34 
 
For example, simplifying the procedures for issuance of the ticket to the bare minimum, 
as well as removing inconvenient repercussions like having one’s license confiscated, 
would carry a significant weight in reducing economic incentives for bribery because it 
decreases t1. 
Even though from (4) it is evident that a decrease in v—monthly quotas imposed 
on traffic policemen—would result in an anti-corruption impact, the direction of the 
change is inconclusive once the role of quotas is examined further. Consider scenario A, 
                                                 
30 Lack of any multiplier 
31 Because of q multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, and in practice q approaches 0 in transition countries 
32 Presence of a (1-q) multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, means that this is not a very effective tool. However, in 
practice, q approaches 0 in transition countries, hence (1-q) approaches 1 and the impact is significant. 
33Because of a q multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 
34 Presence of an m multiplier (driver’s hourly salary), with m >0 unless the driver is unemployed. Since 
m is typically quite large, effect on t would be significant. 
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when officer’s quota is yet unfilled, and there is still time to fill it. Then, the payoffs 
hold: Pr = 
 – (  )
 , and P1-r = . Then officer’s corruptibility condition, Pr > P1-r is:  – (  )
  >  
R > 
  + q (S+ ϵ Z) 
However, now consider scenario B, when officer’s quota is already filled, so each 
additional officially-processed ticket represents 0 payoff. Then: Pr:= 
 – (  @ A)B , and 
P1-r = 0. Then officer’s corruptibility condition, Pr >P1-r  is:  – (  @ A)B  > 0 R > q(S + ϵ Z) 
Lastly, consider scenario C, when officer’s quota is not yet filled, and he/she has a last 
opportunity to fill it during the shift; if he/she does not fill a quota, a non-fulfillment 
penalty L will be imposed on the traffic policemen by his/her supervisors. Then, Pr =  – C&(  )
 , and P1-r = . In this scenario, officer’s corruptibility condition,  
Pr >P1-r  is:  – C&(   )
  >  R > q(S + ϵ Z) 
R > 
  + L + q (S+ ϵ Z)  Comparison of the three conditions, as seen in Table 4 below, reveals 
that depending on a point in time of the officer’s shift when he/she stops a driver, and 
whether the officer has already filled the quota or not, the traffic police officer is either 
very corruptible or a lot less corruptible. Decreasing the quotas could mean that an 
officer will be able to fill the quota faster and reach scenario B sooner. Increasing the 
quotas could mean that an officer will fill the quotas slower and could end up in 
scenario C. If the new quotas are unrealistically high, this could lead to overly-
aggressive patrolling. Given the difficulty of aligning the expected quota with the 
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number of violations a traffic police officer will encounter and have a potential to 
officially process, quotas are a problematic tool in anti-corruption policy. A further 
examination would be appropriate for future research, beyond this basic analysis, in 
order to examine which tool, meant to provide positive material incentives for traffic 
police officers to officially-process every ticket, is the most effective in the presence of 
widespread corruption. 
Table 4. Role of quotas in the exogenous agreement model 
Scenario Officer’s 
corruptibility 
condition 
Interpretation 
A: quota is 
unfilled, not end 
of the shift 
R > 
 + q (S+ ϵ Z) Traffic police officer is an average on the corruptibility scale. 
B: quota is filled R > q(S + ϵ Z) Traffic police officer is most corruptible, 
willing to accept the lowest possible level of 
bribe. 
C: quota is 
unfilled, end of 
the shift 
R > 
 + L + q (S+ ϵ Z) 
Traffic police officer is least corruptible, 
willing to accept the level of bribe at least 
higher than the penalty for non-fulfillment of 
the quota, L. 
 
Furthermore, national income inequality can be included in this analysis. Recall 
that the driver will be prone to corruption if R < (1-q)F – qT + (t1 – t2 – qt1)m, where t1 – t2 is the difference between time it takes to issue a ticket and time it takes to give a 
bribe. A closer look reveals that the higher the hourly salary of the driver, m, the greater 
the role complexity of procedures plays, through the time it takes the upper-income 
driver. On the other hand, for drivers with low values of m, the time spent is less 
important. Fighting corruption is therefore more difficult in countries with high income 
inequality—like the transition countries where business oligarchs and political elites are 
common—since the threshold point for upper-income citizens will be much higher and 
not always within policy reach.  
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Endogenous Agreement Models 
 
The set-up of a sequential game illustrated in the previous section, clearly shows 
the payoffs for “Bribe” - “Bribe” and “Not Bribe” – “Not Bribe” strategies of the driver 
and policeman, but not the payoffs for the players in two “Not Bribe – “Bribe” 
scenarios. 
Figure 9. Simultaneous set-up of the exogenous agreement model revisited 
  D 
  Bribe Not Bribe 
 
 
P 
 
Bribe 
Policeman: 
 – (  )
    
Driver: 
– – – – –   
Policeman: unknown 
Driver: unknown 
 
Not Bribe 
Policeman: unknown 
Driver: unknown 
Policeman: 
  
Driver: 
– –   
 
In order to find the unknown payoffs, I modify the basic set-up to represent a 
simultaneous game and present two situations: (1) when the driver has advantageous 
bargaining power; (2) when the policeman has advantageous bargaining power. The 
main advantage of this different set-up is looking at the outcome of the scenarios where 
the strategies of the driver and traffic policeman do not align. These are cases when the 
driver chooses “Not to Bribe”, and the policeman chooses “Bribe”; when the driver 
chooses “Bribe” and the policeman chooses “Not to Bribe”. The previous model, based 
on Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang models, does not take these scenarios into 
account—it implicitly assumes that as long as there is rent to be gained by both players, 
they will bargain and come to an agreement. In the following models, I challenge this 
assumption and look at cases where there is rent to be gained by both players, but they 
cannot come to an agreement. Additionally, the second advantage of using this modified 
model is being able to incorporate the possibility of policeman letting go of the driver 
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without neither a payment of a fine, nor a bribe, and the differentiation between passive 
bribery and extortive bribery. 
Set-Up: driver has advantageous bargaining power 
The driver can have advantageous bargaining power when: driver is someone 
important, knows the rules and the legal system very well (i.e., knows that a policeman 
does not have sufficient evidence and can successfully challenge the fine in court and 
not have to pay it); policeman is in a hurry (i.e., if the policeman is standing in a sweet 
spot where he can catch many violators, so the goal is to maximise number of cars 
stopped, not each individual bribe). Specific examples of cases where driver had 
advantageous bargaining power are D3 case 3.2, D6 case 6.7, D4 case 4.1 and D2 case 
2.1 and statements 4 and 5, found in Appendix 3. If the bargaining power of the driver 
is greater than the bargaining power of the policeman, i.e., β > β-1, then in the case 
where the driver chooses “Not Bribe” he/she has an advantage and the outcome will be 
the formal process, or being let go35, even if the policeman chose the “Bribe” option (in 
other words, the driver is immune to extortive bribery). Similarly, in the case where 
driver chooses “Bribe” and the police officer chooses “Not Bribe”, the outcome will be 
either a “Bribe”-“Bribe” or a formally-processed fine outcome, “Not Bribe-Not Bribe” 
since the higher bargaining power of the driver might allow him/her to convince the 
police officer. Given that the driver’s bargaining power is β , this is also the probability 
that the driver will be able to influence the traffic policeman towards a driver-
favourable outcome36. The set-up of a simultaneous game-theoretic matrix will look like 
this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Being let go without a bribe or an official fine is equivalent to having a payoff of zero for the driver 
36 This is an author’s assumption. In Nash bargaining, β is used to determine what share of the rent the 
actor gets; in this thesis, the author also uses β in a similar manner, used to also determine with what 
likelihood the actor will be able to convince or influence another actor. 
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Figure 10. Simultaneous game set-up if the driver has advantageous bargaining power 
  D* 
  Bribe Not Bribe 
 
 
 
P 
 
Bribe 
Policeman: 
 – (  )
   
Driver: 
– – – – –   
‘Let go’ or Fine 
Policeman: β (0) +(1-β)    
Driver: β (0) + (1- β) (–F–t1mM ) 
 
Not Bribe 
Bribe or Fine 
Policeman: β( – (  )
 )+(1-β)   
Driver: β(– – – – –  )  +(1-β)(– –  ) 
Policeman: 
  
Driver: 
– –   
* bargaining power advantage, 0 < β < 1 and β  > 0.5 
 
Driver’s reasoning follows. “If the policeman chooses “Not Bribe” I will prefer 
the strategy with a greater payoff, comparing the payoffs: 
β(–  –  –  –  –  )+(1-β)(– –  ) and  – –   
Further, “If the policeman chooses “Bribe”, then my payoff can either be:  –  –  –  –  –  , or β(0)+(1- β) (– –  )” 
On the policeman’s side, his/her reasoning follows. “If the dominant driver chooses 
“Not Bribe”, then my payoff can be: 
β (0) +(1-β) , or  
If the dominant driver chooses “Bribe”, then my payoff can be:  – (  )
 , or β( – (  )
 )+(1-β) ” 
No-corruption equilibrium 
For anti-corruption purposes, the goal is to align incentives so that both the 
driver and the traffic policeman have “Not Bribe” as their dominant strategy. The 
driver’s dominant strategy will be “Not Bribe” if: 
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J−F – tmM >  β(– R – t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtmM ) + (1 − β)(– F – tmM )(1 −  β) (– F – tmM ) >  –  R – t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtmM
1 
K– F– tm >  β(−R– t/m –  qF –  qT–  qtm) + (1 − β)(– F– tm)(1 −  β)(– F – tm) > –  R– t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm 1 K (β)(– F– tm) >  β(– R– t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm)(1 −  β)(– F– tm) > –  R– t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm1 K – F – tm > –  R– t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtm(1 −  β)(– F – tm) > –  R– t/m –  qF–  qT –  qtm1 K R >  F + tm– t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtmR >  (1 −  β)(F + tm)– t/m –  qF–  qT– qtm1 
Since (1 −  β)(– F– tm)– t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm < F + tm– t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm, in 
order for both inequalitites to hold simultaneously, R has to be greater than the bigger of 
the two terms, F + tm– t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtm. Thus, 
Equation 5.Driver's dominant strategy is 'Not Bribe'    (5) R >  F + tm– t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtm 
Is the condition when driver is better off to pick the ‘Not Bribe’ strategy no matter what 
traffic policeman chooses. 
Traffic policeman will have “Not Bribe” as a dominant strategy if : 
J 1v >  (1 − β) 1vβ(R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N ) + (1 − β) 1v >  R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N
1 
Since 
  is always greater than (1 − β)  because 0 < β < 1, we only need to consider 
the second condition and express it in terms of R: 
(1 − β) 1v >  (1 − β)(R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N ) 1v > (R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N  Nv >  R –  q(S +  ϵ Z) 
Equation 6. Traffic policeman's dominant strategy is 'Not Bribe'   (6) Nv +  q(S +  ϵ Z) >  R  
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Only when the bribe is less than the foregone income from the protocol, traffic 
policeman will be better off to select the strategy ‘Not Bribe’, regardless of what the 
dominant driver does. 
Therefore, in a situation when the driver has advantageous bargaining power, 
both the driver and the policeman will both have “Not Bribe” as their dominant 
strategy, (5) and (6) need to hold simultaneously: 
.R >  F + tm– t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtmNv +  q(S +  ϵ Z) > R 1 
.F + tm– t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtm < LR < Nv +  q(S +  ϵ Z) 1 
________________________ 
F + tm– t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtm < R < Nv +  q(S +  ϵ Z) 
Equation 7. The dominant strategy of both parties is 'Not Bribe'   (7) 
(1 − q)F + (t − t/ − qt)m –  qT < R < Nv +  q(S +  ϵ Z) 
Similarly to the exogenous agreement model, (7) represents the interval of R for a no-
corruption equilibrium. This is the condition when the maximum bribe that a driver can 
offer is lower than the minimum bribe that the policeman can accept.  
In order to increase the set R that would fall in that interval, the anti-corruption 
measures should be targeted to reduce (1 − q)F + (t − t/ − qt)m –  qT and increase 
 +  q(S +  ϵ Z). This includes: 
Table 5. Anti-Corruption tools of the endoogenous agreement model where driver has 
advantageous bargaining power 
Code Variable Affecting Change with an 
anti-corruption 
impact 
Level of 
effectiveness 
N Salary of the traffic 
policeman 
Traffic 
policeman 
Increase High37 
v Monthly quota how 
many tickets to write 
Traffic 
policeman 
Inconclusive  
S Penalty  for taking a 
bribe 
Traffic 
policeman 
Increase Low38 
                                                 
37 Lack of any multiplier 
38 Because of q multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, and in practice q approaches 0 in transition countries 
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q Probability of 
detection of traffic 
police bribery 
Traffic 
policeman and 
driver 
Increase High 
F Fine for traffic 
violation 
Driver Decrease Medium-high39 
T Penalty for giving a 
bribe 
Driver Increase Low40 
t1 Time for issuance 
and payment of a 
ticket 
Driver Decrease High41 
 
The outcomes and respective anti-corruption tools for this case, when the driver has 
advantageous bargaining power and agreement is endogenous, are identical to the 
exogenous agreement model. This indicates that the Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-
Yang set-up is for the situations where bribery is passive, but not for situations where 
bribery is extortive, as represented in the next set-up when policeman has advantageous 
bargaining power. 
Set-Up: policeman has advantageous bargaining power 
The situations when policeman has advantageous bargaining power include: 
driver is in a hurry, or does not know the laws, can easily be scared, etc; policeman 
scares the driver with his psychological pressure tactics, or is positioned in a location 
where numerous drivers are prone to the same traffic violation (some examples are D5 
case 5.3, P3 statement 4). If the bargaining power of the policeman is greater than the 
bargaining power of the driver, then if the policeman chooses “Bribe” and the driver 
chooses “Not Bribe” two things can happen: policeman will either be able to extort the 
bribe from the driver, or the policeman will inflate the value of the fine by finding many 
violations and spending a significant amount of time on the interaction, hoping to 
extract a bribe after all. Similarly, if the policeman chooses “Not Bribe” and the driver 
chooses “Bribe”—this can happen when the policeman has one last opportunity to fulfil 
his/her quota—then the outcome will be the same as the “Not Bribe”-“Not Bribe” 
outcome and the driver wont’ be able to convince the policeman for a bribe no matter 
                                                 
39 Presence of a (1-q) multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, means that this is not a very effective tool. However, in 
practice, q approaches 0 in transition countries, hence (1-q) approaches 1 and the impact is significant. 
40Because of a q multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 
41 Presence of an m multiplier (driver’s hourly salary), with m >0 unless the driver is unemployed. Since 
m is typically quite large, effect on t would be significant. 
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how hard he tries, because in this case the policeman has advantageous bargaining 
power. For specific example, see D1 case 1.4 in Appendix 3. Given that the probability 
with which the policeman can achieve an outcome in his/her favour is 1-β, 0 < β < 1 and 
β < 0.5, where β is driver’s bargaining power and consequently 1-β  is policeman’s 
bargaining power. Hence, the set-up of game-theoretic matrix looks like this: 
Figure 11. Simultaneous game set-up if the policeman has advantageous bargaining 
power 
β < β-1  Driver 
  Bribe Not Bribe 
 
 
 
 
Policeman* 
 
 
Bribe 
Policeman: 
 – (  )
   
Driver: 
– – – – –   
Bribe or Fine 
Policeman: (1 − β)  – (  )
 + (β)   
Driver: M1 − βN – R–t2m – qF– qT– qt1mM +(β) –FO–t1PmM  ] 
Not 
Bribe 
Fine only 
Policeman: 
  
Driver:  
– –    
Policeman: 
   
 Driver: 
– –   
* bargaining power advantage 
^ inflated value by policeman 
 
Driver’s logic follows. “If the policeman chooses “Not Bribe”, the driver is 
indifferent between two strategies available to me because payoffs would be both – –   ”. If the policeman chooses “Bribe”, the driver will choose the greater payoff 
between: 
 
–  –  – – –     and (1 − β) –  –   –  –  –   + (β) –O– O   
Traffic policeamn’s logic follows similary. “If the drives chooses “Not Bribe”, then 
he/she compares payoffs: 
(1 − β)  – (  )
 + (β) Q and  Q. 
Similarly, if the drives chooses “Bribe”, the policeman compares:  – (  )
  to Q. 
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No-corruption equilibrium 
For both the driver and traffic policeman to end up in the no-corruption 
equilibrium, both the traffic policeman and the driver need to have “Not Bribe” as the 
dominant strategy. That will be driver’s dominant strategy if: 
M1 − βN –  R– t2m –  qF –  qT –  qt1mM + MβN – FO − t1PmM > –  R – t2m –  qF – qT –  qt1mM  
(β) – FR − tS mM >  (β) – R – t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtmM  −FR − tS m > – R – t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtm 
Policeman’s dominant strategy will be “Not Bribe” if and only if: 
J1v >  (1 − β) R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N + (β) 1v1v >  R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N
1 
J(1 − β) 1v >  (1 − β) R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N1v >  R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N
1 
_______________________________ 1v >  R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N  
 R –  q(S +  ϵ Z)N < 1v 
R –  q(S +  ϵ Z) < Nv  
i.e., when the officer’s net gain from protocol exceeds net gain from bribe, policeman’s 
dominant strategy will be ‘Not Bribe’ regardless of what the opponent does: 
Equation 8. Policeman's dominant strategy is 'Not Bribe'    (8) 
R < Nv + q(S +  ϵ Z) 
In the situation where traffic policeman has advantageous bargaining power, 
both players will end-up in a no-corruption equilibrium, by having “Not Bribe” as the 
dominant strategy, if: 
 .−FR − tS m > –  R – t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtmR –  q(S +  ϵ Z) < 
 1 
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T−FR − tS m > –  R – t/m –  qF –  qT –  qtmNv > R –  q(S +  ϵ Z) 1 
TR > FR + tS m – t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtmR >  − Nv − q(S +  ϵ Z) 1 
To solve these two inequalities, we need to compare:   FR + tS m – t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm to − 
 − q(S +  ϵ Z). FR + tS m – t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm > − 
 − q(S +  ϵ Z) 
because − 
 − q(S +  ϵ Z) , 0 < q < 1, q approaches 0 in transition countries and 
therefore FR + tS m – t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm is likely to be positive. In order for the two 
inequalities to hold simultaneously, R has to be larger than the greater of the two terms, 
hence: 
Equation 9. Driver's dominant strategy is 'Not Bribe'    (9) R > FR + tS m – t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm 
In order for both parties to have ‘Not Bribe’ as their dominant strategy, (8) and 
(9) have to hold simultaneously: 
T R < Nv + q(S +  ϵ Z)R > FR + tS m – t/m –  qF–  qT–  qtm1 
T R < Nv + q(S +  ϵ Z)FR –  qF –  qT + (tS   – t/ –  qt)m < L1 
____________________________________ 
Equation 10. Both parties have 'Not Bribe' as their dominant strategy  (10) 
FR –  qF –  qT + (tS   – t/ –  qt)m < R < Nv + q(S +  ϵ Z) 
Double inequality in (10), like in the previous two models, also represents a case where 
the maximum size of the bribe the driver is willing to give exceeds the minimum size of 
the bribe that it is profitable for the policeman to take.  
Therefore, an anti-corruption initiative aimed at curbing traffic police bribery 
should (separately or simultaneously) increase  

  + q (S+ ϵ Z) and decrease 
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FR –  qF –  qT + MtS m  – t/ –  qtNm. This would widen the interval that satisfies this 
double inequality and increase the possible sets of R possible. The following table 
illustrates how this could be achieved by impacting individual variables. 
Table 6. Anti-Corruption tools when policeman has bargaining advantage 
Code Variable Affecting Change with an 
anti-corruption 
impact 
Level of 
effectiveness 
N Salary of the traffic 
policeman 
Traffic 
policeman 
Increase High42 
v Monthly quota how 
many tickets to write 
Traffic 
policeman 
Inconclusive43  
S Penalty  for taking a 
bribe 
Traffic 
policeman 
Increase Low44 
q Probability of detection 
of traffic police bribery 
Traffic 
policeman 
and driver 
Increase High 
F^ Inflated fine for traffic 
violation 
Driver Decrease High45 
F Real fine for traffic 
violation 
Driver Increase Low46 
T Penalty for giving a 
bribe 
Driver Increase Low47 
tS  Time for issuance and 
payment of a ticket, 
inflated by the traffic 
police officer 
Driver Decrease High48 
 
Decreasing the inflated fine for traffic violation, a tool with high effectiveness based on 
the above analysis, could be translated as decreasing the possibility for the traffic police 
officer to inflate the fine. In practical terms, this includes simple rules of the road that 
do not change frequently, with minimum subjective interpretation, and narrow fine 
margins for any single violation. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Lack of any multiplier 
43 See the analysis of quotas for the sequential model 
44 Because of q multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, and in practice q approaches 0 in transition countries 
45 Note absence of any multiplier 
46Because of a q multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 
47Because of a q multiplier, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 
48 Presence of an m multiplier (driver’s hourly salary), with m >0 unless the driver is unemployed. Since 
m is typically quite large, effect on t would be significant. 
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Summary of Findings 
 
In this chapter, different modelling set-ups of driver-policeman interactions were 
used to generate a mathematical condition (a double inequality) for a no-corruption 
equilibrium. Specifically, the double inequality indicated a bribe interval, where the 
maximum bribe a rational and utility-maximising driver is willing to offer is lower than 
the minimum bribe a rational and utility-maximising traffic policeman is willing to 
accept. Utilising this condition, measures were derived to increase this bribe interval 
that leads to a no-corruption equilibrium of the game—the anti-corruption measures of 
the models. In sum, the modified Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang models 
generated measures similar to the simultaneous models where either the driver or the 
traffic policeman has a bargaining advantage, but not identical, as seen from Table 6 
below.  
Table 7. Summary of anti-corruption measures 
   
Modified  
B-G and  
C-L-Y 
Model 
“Driver has 
advantageous 
bargaining 
power” Model 
“Policeman has 
advantageous 
bargaining 
power” Model 
Code Variable Affecting Change with an Anti-Corruption Impact 
N Salary of the 
traffic 
policeman 
Traffic 
policeman 
Increase** Increase** Increase** 
v Monthly 
quota how 
many tickets 
to write 
Traffic 
policeman 
Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive 
S Penalty  for 
taking a 
bribe 
Traffic 
policeman 
Increase Increase Increase 
q Probability 
of detection 
of traffic 
police 
bribery 
Traffic 
policeman 
and driver 
Increase** Increase** Increase** 
F^ Inflated fine 
for traffic 
Driver -- -- Decrease** 
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violation 
F Real fine for 
traffic 
violation 
Driver Decrease* Decrease* Increase 
T Penalty for 
giving a 
bribe 
Driver Increase Increase Increase 
U , US  Time for 
issuance and 
payment of a 
ticket, real 
and inflated 
Driver Decrease** Decrease** Decrease** 
** high effectiveness 
* medium-high effectiveness 
lack of a * indicates low effectiveness 
 
Using all three models makes the anti-corruption measures more robust, regardless of 
whether the assumption of agreement is exogenised or not. The third model where 
traffic policeman has advantageous bargaining power provides two additional policy 
tools, linked to potential inflation of the fine by the traffic policeman.  
Based on this modelling, effective policy tools to decrease the level of traffic 
police bribery in transition countries are: (1) increasing the salary of traffic policemen, 
(2) increasing the probability of detection of corruption, (3) decreasing the time it takes 
to issue, process and pay for a formally-issued ticket of traffic violation and decreasing 
the repercussions of each fine on record, (4) decreasing the possibility for fine-inflation 
on behalf of the traffic policeman, which can also be done via (5) increasing drivers’ 
bargaining advantage and public awareness through clear and simple laws that do not 
change. Quotas, which provide positive material incentive to formally register a set 
amount of violations a month, are nevertheless a questionable policy tool in the 
presence of corruption. Income and financial incentives are significant determinants of 
corruption, which lends support to wage theories of anti-corruption policy, advocating 
for at least efficiency wages for government bureaucrats. Nevertheless, presence of high 
income inequality among transition countries makes traffic police bribery also more 
difficult to tackle. 
Only three out of five key policy measures could have been generated solely 
with the modified Bowles-Garoupa and Chang-Lai-Yang models. The inclusion of 
models with agreement outcome derived by the model, as opposed to assumed 
exogenous, provided insight regarding the importance of increasing driver’s bargaining 
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advantage and decreasing the possibility of fine-inflation on behalf of traffic 
policemen—both effective anti-corruption tools. The latter translates into practical 
terms as simple rules of the road that do not change frequently, with minimum 
subjective interpretation, and narrow fine margins for any single violation. If the rules 
are simple and do not change, then an increase in driver’s bargaining power, relative to 
traffic policeman’s, will take place automatically. Currently, transition countries are still 
characterised by authoritarian police. A transition to ‘democratic policing’ and a culture 
of public service, as outlined by Caparini and Marenin (2005), would further increase 
driver’s bargaining power by reducing policeman’s opportunities to psychologically and 
physically intimidate the driver. 
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CHAPTER III. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
  
This section is an empirical application of the models to real anti-corruption 
reforms in traffic police bribery that took place. The theoretical models represent 
individual interactions and provide micro-level changes necessary to shift the 
equilibrium of the game from a corruption to a non-corruption outcome. The national 
level of traffic police bribery can be conceptualised as the set of micro-level interactions 
that result in a corruption equilibrium of the game. The greater the proportion of micro-
level interactions that result in a no-corruption equilibrium, the lower the national level 
of traffic police bribery. This makes it possible to test the micro-level theoretical models 
with case studies of national traffic police reform, because a macro measure—such as 
increasing salaries of all policemen across the board—influences individual decisions of 
traffic police officers in every interaction with the driver, thus reducing the number of 
micro-level interactions that result in corruption. 
Several countries have implemented macro measures in traffic police reform, at 
various points in time during the transition, with varying strength of measures, and with 
varying impact on the level of corruption. Besides Ukraine and Georgia, reforms were 
also implemented in the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Poland; a comparative reform 
table can be found in Appendix 4. In Estonia, for instance, significant personnel 
changes took place49 as a result of the first wave of traffic police reform in early 1990s 
and good command of Estonian language was introduced as a new mandatory 
requirement. Two subsequent waves of traffic police reform, in 1999 and 2004, resulted 
in higher salaries and creation of new jobs by cost-cutting (Savina, 2007). The Czech 
reform of traffic police also included a salary increase, albeit by only 7% (Savina, 
2007). In the Polish case, the salaries grew two-fold, coupled with abolition of cash 
                                                 
49 By 1993, 50% of 5,504 police officers were inexperienced new hires, with 37% younger than 25 and 
“between 1993 and 1997, 3975 new police officers were recruited...during this same period 1386 officers 
were released from duty” (Saar, 1999) 
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fines—discretionary and motivating unofficial payments—which also led to reduction 
in the level of traffic police bribery (Savina, 2007). However, such measures were 
implemented as part of the general police reform package, not specifically aimed 
against corruption. In Georgia and Ukraine, the reforms were aimed at corruption-
curbing within the traffic police, and the measures were more harsh than in the 
Estonian, Czech and Polish cases. Therefore, based on comparison between traffic 
police reforms in these transition countries, the two cases of Ukraine and Georgia were 
selected as the best cases to test whether the theoretical model is in line with the results 
in practice.  
Ukrainian reforms of 2005-2008 targeted one set of variables, while Georgian 
reforms of 2004 targeted another set of variables. In the case of both, reform measures 
were drastic enough to generate substantial change. In the case of Georgia, the level of 
traffic police bribery substantially decreased. In the case of Ukraine, the level of traffic 
police bribery moderately increased or remained the same, depending on the measure. 
The following Table 6 presents a reform summary of what variables were affected by 
the two reforms and how. 
Table 8. Comparison of Georgian and Ukrainian reform measures 
Variable Georgia Ukraine 
Dependent variable   
Level of traffic police 
bribery 
Significant decrease in 
frequency of traffic police 
bribery 
Some increase in frequency 
of traffic police bribery; 
Increase in the size of the 
bribe 
   
Explanatory variables present in the models 
Salaries of traffic police 
officers 
Increased; 8-fold Increased; 2- or 3-fold 
Fines and possibilities for 
fine-inflation 
No change in fines. 
Decrease in repercussions 
of traffic violations. 
Decrease in possibilities for 
fine-inflation 
Substantial increase in fines 
and repercussions; on 
average at least a 10-fold 
increase in fines. 
No change in possibilities 
for fine inflation: increase 
in possibilities due to 
legislation, decrease due to 
heightened driver 
awareness  
Probability of detection Significant increase; 
upgrade of technology 
No change 
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(cars, radar equipment, 
office, processing software) 
Time to process and pay for 
the ticket 
Substantial decrease No change 
Quotas Abolished; focus on 
accurate and thorough 
recording, not on total 
numbers 
No change; focus on total 
numbers as indicators of 
performance 
Penalty for bribery Increased to up to 9 years 
in prison (for taking bribes) 
No change 
Explanatory variable not present in the models 
Past experience Significant decrease: 
15,000 officers fired, very 
few hired back 
No impact (organisational 
reshuffling): number of 
officers fired = number of 
officers re-hired in other 
police departments 
 
All reform measures implemented in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, except 
for one, are directly reflected in the theoretical models. The theoretical models also 
accurately predicted the dynamics of increasing or decreasing the variables in practice. 
In Georgia, for instance, an 8-fold increase in salaries of traffic policemen was hailed as 
one of the significant changes that led to a decrease in traffic police bribery. This is in 
line with the model and supports the classical policy literature in favour of efficiency 
wages for government bureaucrats. In Ukraine, on the other hand, the fines and 
repercussions for traffic violations were increased 10-fold, resulting in higher bribe size 
and moderately higher frequency of bribery; this is also in line with the model—higher 
fine leads to a higher equilibrium bribe size.  
Only one reform measure—replacement of old police officers with new ones—
was not present in the theoretical models. Since past experience of corruption and 
exposure to it cannot be changed in each individual traffic policeman, an alternate 
reform measure with the same aggregate impact is replacement of every traffic police 
officer. Such organisational replacement of old traffic policemen with newly trained 
recruits was a defining measure of the Georgian case, and absent in the Ukrainian one. 
The theoretical models do not include the variable of past experience and exposure to 
corruption because that would require additional dynamic modelling and inclusion of 
evolutionary game-theoretic elements, which were deemed beyond the practical scope 
of this study. All in all, further analysis regarding the quality and usefulness of the 
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models in light of empirical evidence can be found at the end of this Chapter, where a 
calibration exercise is presented to show that the models generated accurate predictions 
regarding the change in level of traffic police bribery in Georgia and in Ukraine. 
 
 
Georgian Case Study 
 
In Georgia, several tough measures were implemented to fight corruption in 
traffic police, and the overall level of traffic police bribery substantially fell. This 
section describes the Georgian traffic police reform in greater depth and contrasts the 
reform outcomes with the findings from the models. Following a brief introductory 
background, the reform measures are analysed, variable-by-variable. 
Background 
Anti-corruption campaigns have a long tradition in Georgia. In soviet times they 
disguised political purges. Under the former president Eduard Shevarnadze, the practice 
of corruption became institutionalised on many levels (Magradze, 2007). Shevarnadze’s 
anti-corruption campaigns were primarily intended at satisfying international creditors 
and hence the Georgian population had grown sceptical of official anti-corruption 
declarations by the time president Saakashvili took office (Di Puppo, 2005). Following 
the Rose Revolution in November 2003, new President Saakashvili declared eradication 
of corruption as a main policy priority, alongside the restoration of Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, and controversially fired several top officials50 connected to Shevarnadze 
immediately after taking office (Di Puppo, 2005).  
The differences in institutional approaches to police and corruption between 
Shevarnadze’s and Saakashvili’s administrations were stark. Shevarnadze’s discourse 
was that corruption is a phenomenon inherent to Georgian mentality. Saakashvili’s 
discourse, on the other hand, denied this argument and presented corruption as a 
phenomenon that could be eradicated. Overall, Saakashvili’s national anti-corruption 
strategy was two-fold: (1) targeting of “power ministries”—the interior ministry, state 
                                                 
50 The chief of Georgian railways, the former energy minister and Shevardnadze’s son-in-law were 
arrested and charged with tax evasion and embezzlement. 
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security, ministry of defence; (2) introducing meritocracy by increasing salaries of tax 
police officers, judges, customs officers. (Di Puppo, 2005) 
Reform measures 
In the summer of 2004, Saakashvili fired the entire traffic police force—nearly 
15,000 officers—regardless of ideological, political or other affiliations of police 
officers (Saakashvili, 2005). Then, the recruitment competition was announced: newly 
assembled personnel staff included 2,000 policemen (Anon, 2006a), a net 87% 
reduction in personnel. Only 15% of the new staff had worked as traffic policemen 
before, and 85% were new recruits with no past experience in law enforcement 
agencies. The short-term drawback of this measure is serious lack of qualified personnel 
and understaffed road safety patrols (Savina, 2007). The long-term shortcoming of this 
measure involved a challenging task of re-employment and re-integration of 14,000 
policemen and high social costs in unemployment benefits; this resulted in large police 
demonstrations took place and instability within the police (Boda and Kakachia, 2005). 
On the other hand, 85% of new recruits had no past experience taking bribes as traffic 
policemen, and had no co-workers or supervisors to learn it from. Although the variable 
of ‘past experience’ is not present in game-theoretic modelling of this study, the case of 
Georgia demonstrates that impacting this variable is an important anti-corruption tool. 
All the recruited people were sent to the police academy for a 3-month training, 
where the emphasis was placed on service to the citizens and citizens’ rights. Patrolling 
the streets, ensuring safety, even resolving domestic disputes was instructed as 
provision of public service, as opposed to an authoritarian responsibility. This change 
from authoritarian policing to democratic policing decreased the bargaining power of 
the traffic police officer and increased the bargaining power of the driver. 
A key reform measure was an 8-fold increase in the salaries of traffic policemen. 
Prior to the reform, the official salary was 50 USD per month. As a result of the reform, 
salary became 400 USD per month (Siegel, 2005). According to other sources, monthly 
salaries were raised to 350-500 lari, equivalent to 150-210 EUR, or 300 USD per month 
(Boda and Kakachia 2005). To further decrease the financial burden of traffic 
policemen and the financial motivation that a desire for status entails, the traffic 
policemen were provided with status items. In the words of Saakashvili: “we gave them 
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new nice uniforms ...we gave them new German cars, American radios, the US-looking 
badges [with emblems]” (Siegel, 2005). Both the interviews and the models highlighted 
the significant role of financial incentives—or the lack of adequate income—as 
determinants of bribery on the side of traffic policeman, which indicates that practice is 
in line with the theory 
Furthermore, the penalty for taking bribes was increased to up to nine years in 
prison and since the reform, about 100 criminal cases against bribery were brought 
(Savina, 2007). There is now zero tolerance towards torture and intimidation tactics 
(Siegel, 2005), including extremely tough penalties upon detection. Furthermore, 
significant technological upgrade (Siegel, 2005) also produced an increase in the 
probability of detection. In the theoretical models, increasing the penalty (on both the 
bribe-taker and the bribe-giver) turned out to be an anti-corruption tool with a lower 
effectiveness level, compared to increasing salaries and reducing the time for processing 
and payment of the official ticket. In the Georgian case, however, the penalty increase 
was substantial, though it is unclear to what extent this measure alone would have led to 
lower traffic police bribery.  
As for the quotas—unofficial statistical requirements—this practice was 
abolished. “The staff were told, that the percentage of crimes uncovered is not the most 
important thing. The new most important thing was for everything to be recorded” 
(Siegel, 2005). This new approach that provides a positive material incentive to the 
traffic policeman for official processing of violations represents a better alternative than 
the system of unofficial quotas and statistics, which the models have shows to be a 
questionable motivational tool given widespread corruption. 
Change in traffic police bribery 
According to the survey conducted in Georgia in 200051, 57% of households felt 
that corruption was worse relative to 4 years ago, and noted that corruption was an 
essential or useful part of doing business. The institution of traffic police generally 
received the worst ratings in terms of bribery, honesty and integrity, and is considered a 
corruption “hot spot”. According to the households in contact with the traffic police, 
                                                 
51 Survey conducted by Georgian Opinion Research Bureau International with the collaboration and 
support of the Government of Georgia and with funding from The World Bank and USAID 
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bribes are required on average in 7 out of 10 contacts, which is illustrated in Figure 14 
below: 
Figure 12. Frequency of unofficial payments by households to various agencies 
 
Source: The World Bank, 2000. Corruption in Georgia: Survey Evidence.  95% intervals. 
 
Prior to the reform, the most feared and hated people in Georgia were the traffic 
police, not the KGB goons, the criminal militias or the fat-cat business pals and wealthy 
relatives of the former president (McDonald, 2007). Via arbitrary fines, Georgian 
households were forced to pay as much as 30% of total unofficial payments to traffic 
police, as illustrated by the Figure below. Transfers to traffic police therefore 
represented 0.84% of household income among the households that admitted to paying 
bribes. (Source: Corruption in Georgia: Survey Evidence, The World Bank.). Specifically 
“Before the traffic police reform, traffic cops would 
station themselves on city streets or rural highways, using 
their white batons to wave over motorists at random. 
Their arbitrary, on the spot fines could easily equal a 
week’s wages for the average Georgian. Arguing a fine 
could result in a beating, the loss of one’s vehicle or 
worse. Part of each officer’s daily take was kicked up to 
his superiors, further links in the chain of corruption.”  
Source: Firing of traffic police force stands as a symbol of hope in Georgia, 2005 
Following the reform, the impact was substantial and immediate visible, 
according to several sources:  
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“People were used to dirty/untidy policemen taking 
money on every corner, and suddenly they were replaced 
by young/new people, on modern Volkswagens, who did 
not take bribes” (Savina, 2007). 
“Car-drivers are no longer stopped and asked to pay 
bribes by policemen at improvised road check points and 
the disappearance of the corrupt traffic police” 
(Di Puppo, 2005) 
 
According to Alexander Rondeli, presidential adviser and former Georgian diplomat, 
after the reform police as an institution started to be liked and gain respect among the 
population: “People actually like the police now, it shows people that the very worst 
part of our society could be reformed, shows’ there is hope” (McDonald, 2007). Further 
in support of the qualitative statements, social surveys demonstrate that 96% of the 
population admits that police is not corrupt—an average of only 3.8% of drivers 
surveyed in 2006 admitted to giving bribes to traffic policemen after the reforms 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2006): 
Table 9. Traffic police bribery in Georgia, 2005-2006 
Proportion of respondents who have given a bribe  
to a traffic policeman in 2005 
In villages 3.7% 
In small- and medium-size town 3.9% 
In Tbilisi 4.1% 
Average 3.8% 
   Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs (2006) 
Even RIA Novosti, a Russian news source typically very critical of Georgia, notes that 
the reform managed to “win over” (Anon, 2006a) the bribery on Georgian roads. 
 
 
Ukrainian Case Study 
 
The Ukrainian traffic police reform aimed at curbing corruption at first looked 
like a carbon copy of the Georgian reform measures, but over time turned out to include 
only one drastic measure—increase in fines—and marginal impact on the other 
variables. The overall level of traffic police bribery remained the same or even 
increased by some accounts. This section describes the Ukrianian traffic police reform 
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in greater depth and contrasts the reform outcomes with the findings from the models. 
Following a brief introductory background, the reform measures are presented and 
analysed, variable-by-variable. 
Background 
During transition, the emergence of private sector in the Ukrainian services 
prone to corruption (university admissions, medical services, telephone installations, 
etc.) has reduced the amount of petty corruption. Yet the traffic police—as well as other 
services offered by other law enforcement offices—has remained the monopoly of the 
state. As a result, bribes were often offered and taken for speeding up the procedure, 
evading or easing punishment, etc. The main reasons for post-Soviet corruption, namely 
the over-regulation of economic and social activities, weak administrative control and 
judicial review, coupled with low salaries for public officials, remained in force. On the 
supply side of bribery, post-Soviet factors also play a role. Offering additional payments 
as a way of smoothing otherwise lengthy and complicated official procedures was a 
habit inherited from the Soviet times when “petty bribery and connections were the 
main and often the only way of obtaining deficit goods and services”. (Pavlenko, 2001) 
In police force, “very little progress has been made in democratizing police 
relations with the public despite numerous declarations, presidential edicts, and even 
changes to the law” (Beck, 2005). Up to 2005, The Ministry of the Interior retained a 
strong centralized structure (Beck, 2005), militia had not been yet fully demilitarised, 
and police salaries lacked appropriate increases (Hobbing, 2005). Although in 2007 the 
Ministry of the Interior had developed a concept note and specific goals, objectives and 
operationalised tasks in order to bring Ukrainian policing to European democratic 
standards of law enforcement, this element of the reform had not been followed 
through.  
Reform measures 
Specifically, the reform of Ukrainian traffic police—called State Auto 
Inspection in Ukrainian and also known as ‘DAI’—began in the summer of 2005, with 
the original intention to follow the Georgian example. On 18 July 2In July 2005, the 
President Viktor Yushchenko announced the liquidation of DAI in one single day, with 
the aim to stop DAI’s bribe-seeking raids, particularly ‘from out of the bushes’ 
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(Chyrfush, 2005). However, mass publicity of a 20% spike in traffic accidents and 
lobbying to reinstate DAI back (Morzharetto, 2005) ultimately resulted in prolonging 
the time required for reform and significant down-scaling of the measures. The re-
written reform agenda was based on organizational restructuring and minor reduction in 
overall personnel levels52. By August, deputy minister of Internal Affairs announced 
that DAI had not been liquidated and instead, reforming the ministry will take three 
months. The plan in force remained to narrow DAI down to 3,000 employees via 
reshuffling and reorganization with the patrol services (Morzharetto, 2005). By the end 
of 2006, however, when the structural reorganisation of DAI had been completed, only 
organisational reshuffling took place. As a result, DAI personnel number decreased 2-
fold, while the patrol service personnel increased 40%. Hence, total personnel numbers 
remained equally high; disbanding and hiring new recruits, like in Georgia, did not take 
place. 
  The only substantial and harsh measure of the reform was an increase in fines. 
This took place during the second wave of traffic police reform in November-December 
200853. Below are several of the changes in administrative fines; the fines amount has 
been also converted to USD at the rate of 5.78UAH per USD54 which was in effect in 
November 2008, in order to show that the fines that were previously low by 
international standard, were sharply raised to a significantly high level, particularly for a 
country with a yearly per capita income estimated at 7,400 USD (PPP) in 200855. 
Table 10. Changes in fines for traffic violations in Ukraine 
Violation  Previous fine  New fine  Times 
increase 
Not wearing a seat belt 
Art. 121 Code of 
administrative violations  
From 3.4 to 8.5 UAH 
(0.58 to 1.47 USD) 
From 51 to 85 UAH 
(8.82 to 14.71 USD) 
10 to 15 
Inadequate technical From 17 to 34 UAH  From 340 to 425 UAH 13 to 20 
                                                 
52 from 23,000 DAI employees, 10,000 will be blended with the ‘foot patrol’, creating a single patrol 
entity; 3,000 employees will remain as post controllers, with 2,500 present on highway checkpoints. The 
patrol service is supposed to be enforcing safety on the streets and house yards, while the ‘new state auto 
inspection’ is supposed to operate only in major towns and the new staff/personnel levels are supposed to 
be significantly lower (Morzharetto, 2005). 
53 Act of changes to several legislative acts of Ukraine with reference to improvement of regulation of 
traffic safety, 2008. 
54 Based on November 2008 exchange rate. National Bank of Ukraine historical currency data available 
at: http://www.bank.gov.ua/Fin_ryn/OF_KURS/Currency/SearchPeriod.aspx 
55 See, for instance, CIA World Factbook at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/up.html 
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condition, outdated 
technical inspection Art. 
121 Code of administrative 
violations  
(2.94 to 5.88 USD) 
   
(58.82 to 73.53 USD)  
Lacking/dirty license 
plates, lack of technical 
inspection sticker Art. 121 
Code of administrative 
violations  
From 34 to 85 UAH  
(5.88 to 14.71 USD) 
From 170 to 255 UAH  
(29.41 to 44.12 USD) 
3 to 5 
Speeding Art. 122 Code of 
administrative violations  
20+ km/h over the speed 
limit: warning or fine 
from 8.5 to 17 UAH  
(1.47 to 2.94 USD) 
20+ km/h over the 
speed limit: from 255 
to 340 UAH (44.12 to 
58.82 USD) 
50+ km/h over the 
speed limit: from 510 
to 680 UAH (88.24 to 
117.65 USD 
 30 to 40 
Violations involving an 
intersection, a red light, or 
overtaking Art. 122 Code 
of administrative violations  
From 3.4 to 17 UAH 
(0.58 to 2.94 USD)  
From 425 to 510 UAH 
(73.53 to 88.24 USD)  
30 to 125 
Using a mobile phone 
without a handsfree device  
Art. 122 Code of 
administrative violations  
none From 425 to 510 UAH  
(73.53 to 88.24 USD) 
75 to 90 
Creating an accident-
prone situation, 
documented and proven, 
Art.122 Code of 
administrative violations  
From 34 to 68 UAH 
(5.88 to 11.75 USD) or 
loss of driving license for 
6-12 months  
From 680 to 850 UAH 
(88.24 to 147.06) or 
loss of driving license 
for 6-12 months  
13 to 20 
Driving without a license 
or insurance Art. 126 Code 
of administrative violations  
From 8.5 to 17 UAH  
(1.47 to 2.94 USD)   
From 425 to 850 UAH  
(73.53 to 147.06 USD) 
50 
Driving while intoxicated 
Art. 130 Code of 
administrative violations 
  
First violation: from 255 
to 340 UAH (44.12 to 
58.82 USD) or loss of a 
driving license for 12-24 
months  
Second violation in the 
same year: from 340 to 
680 UAH (44.12 to 88.24 
USD) or loss of a driving 
license for 24-32 months  
First violation: from 
2550 to 3400 UAH 
(441.18 to 588.24 
USD) or loss of a 
driving license for 12-
24 months  
Second violation in the 
same year: loss of 
driving license for 24-
48 months  
10 
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According to all three models, based on the equilibrium bribe size obtained from 
the Nash bargaining, an increase in fines for traffic violations leads to an increase in the 
size of the equilibrium bribe. Furthermore, further theoretical investigation of this by 
Chang, Lai, and Yang (2000) shows that in the presence of widespread corruption, an 
increase in fines does not act as a deterrent of crime, and the level of corruption is likely 
to increase. The endogenous agreement model where traffic policeman has 
advantageous bargaining power and the possibility to inflate the fine while attempting 
to extort a bribe predicts that in case of Ukraine—a transition country with authoritarian 
police—higher fines and wide brackets of fines lead to an increase in extortive bribery.  
As for increasing the salaries of traffic policemen, the measure was not nearly as 
drastic as in Georgia. In 2005, salary of entry-level officer was 500 UAH, in 2006 1,000 
UAH. By 2008-2009, the entry-level salaries of DAI policemen have gradually been 
increased 1.5 times to 1,500 UAH. Starting from 1 September 2009, the average salaries 
of DAI policemen were also projected to increase, additional 34%: from 3,000 UAH 
monthly (circa 500 USD), varying from 1,500 UAH (250 USD) monthly salary to a 
first-year sergeant, to 4,500 UAH (circa 800 USD) monthly salary to an officer with 20 
years of experience. The 2010 new average salary is 3,500-3,900 UAH monthly (600-
700 USD). If one is to consider the overall increase in averages from 1,850 to 3,500 
UAH, that is slightly less than a 2-fold increase; an increase in entry-level salaries from 
500 to 1500 UAH is a 3-fold increase. (Anon, 2008) 
Given that the increase in Georgian salaries was 8-fold, while the increase in 
Ukrainian salaries was 3-fold, this highlights not only the direction of change, but also 
the level of change required to successfully generate a shift from a corruption to no-
corruption equilibrium. It is noteworthy that a 2-fold increase over several years, when 
local currency inflation annual inflation averaged around 15% and in December 2008 
was as high as 22.3% (Anon, 2009a), is also much less than a 2-fold increase in salaries 
overnight. Hence, based on the case studies alone, it is possible to tentatively conclude 
that the increase in salaries implemented in Ukraine did not provide significant financial 
motivation to not to accept a bribe in the micro-level interaction of driver-traffic 
policeman, and on the macro-level did not generate a decrease in traffic police bribery. 
According to the models, an increase in salaries should negatively influence the 
level of corruption. However, a 2- or a 3-fold increase is not substantial enough in the 
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presence of fines that have an opposing effect on the susceptibility of traffic police 
officer to the bribery. This can be seen in the calibration exercise in the following 
section. 
The remaining aspects of DAI reform included a marginal technical upgrade and 
changes to the legal basis (Anon, 2006b). Technical upgrade in Georgia contribute to 
increased probability of detection; in Ukraine, on the other hand, the technical upgrade 
included speedometers with inaccurate measurements, which widened the possibility for 
fine-inflation by a traffic policeman with advantageous bargaining power. 
Change in traffic police bribery 
There have not been any drastic changes in the level of traffic police bribery in 
Ukraine.  Following the reform, various sources reported on the similar or increased 
frequency of traffic police bribery, and on the increased bribe size. For instance, 
according to a parliament member Svyatoslav Oliynyk, an increase in fines led to an 
increase in bribes to traffic policemen, but the equilibrium bribe is still lower than the 
fine:  
“50 or 60 UAH is a typical amount of a bribe nowadays 
[December 2009], which is still 3-4 times less than the 
average traffic violation fine.” (Lashchenko and Naboka, 
2009) 
 
Furthermore, the Lonely Planet guide book blog discussion from 2009 reached a 
consensus is that in Ukraine, drivers are not stopped unless they are violating a traffic 
law, but if they are stopped by traffic police, a bribe of up to $10 will often suffice for a 
minor violation (70 UAH), which is higher than it used to be, $5 (25 UAH) before the 
increased fines (Lonely Planet, 2009). 
As for the overall level of corruption after reform, a USAID Ukraine report 
reveals that over 60% of survey respondents in Ukraine are ready to pay bribes to traffic 
police, among which 31% do it to save time and effort (Anon, 2009b). According to a 
pre-election poll conducted in January 2009, the majority of Ukrainians, regardless of 
their voting preference, consider that the level of traffic police bribery increased as a 
result of the fines (PACE, 2009). 
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Models Versus Case Studies 
 
In order to further assess the quality of the model and the predictions, let us 
consider a calibration exercise, where all the variables are taken to roughly resemble an 
average case for an average violation. Let the driver’s violation be exceeding the speed 
limit, up to 30%, which is usually not considered ‘dangerous’ and therefore additional 
fines are not imposed. First, let us consider, based on Equation 10 of the models, what 
the equilibrium will be in Georgia and in Ukraine, in an interaction of an imaginary 
driver and imaginary traffic policeman: 
Table 11. Hypothetical interaction scenario in Georgia and in Ukraine 
Variable Code In Georgia In Ukraine 
Fine for speeding F 20 lari 17 UAH 
Inflated fine for speeding F^ - - 
Probability of detection q 0.01 0.01 
Penalty on bribe-giver T 0 0 
Driver’s time spent if receves a ticket 
and pays for it 
t1 156 hour 157 hour 
Driver’s time spent if pays a bribe t2 5 minutes =  
0.083 hour 
5 minutes =  
0.083 hour 
Driver’s hourly salary m 2 lari 50 UAH 
Entry-level policeman’s monthly 
salary 
N 100 lari 500 UAH 
Policeman’s monthly quota 
requirement 
v none 40 protocols 
Penalty on policeman if caught S Fired = 1 monthly 
salary 
Fired = 1 monthly 
salary 
Policeman’s psychological cost ϵ Z 0 0 
Equations for a bribe, R,: 
Driver’s max.: FR –  qF –  qT + MtS   – t/ –  qtNm; Policeman’s min.: 
  + q (S+ ϵ Z ) 
 
Inserting these approximated values into the equations for an equilibrium bribe, 
both in Ukraine and in Georgia, this situation would result in a corrupt outcome, 
because the minimum bribe this policeman is willing to offer is less than the maximum 
bribe the drive is willing to give: 
In Georgia: 1 lari < R < 20.707 lari 
In Ukraine: 17.5 hryvnias < R < 62.15 hryvnias 
                                                 
56 30 minutes to issue a protocol of violation, 30 minutes to pay the fine at the bank 
57 30 minutes to issue a protocol of violation, 30 minutes to pay the fine at the bank 
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In Georgia, the maximum bribe the driver is willing to offer is 20.707 lari, while the 
minimum bribe the traffic policeman is willing to accept is 1 lari. Similarly, in Ukraine, 
policeman’s minimum is 17.5 hryvnias, while driver’s maximum is 62.15 hryvnias. 
 Now, let us consider the outcome of the game when a similar imaginary driver 
and imaginary traffic policeman interact again after the reforms take place in both 
countries. Using the reforms that took place as a numerical basis, In Georgia, 
policeman’s monthly salary increased 8-fold from 100 lari to 800 lari; in Ukraine, the 
salary increased 3-fold from 500 hryvnias to 1500 hryvnias. In Georgia, the probability 
of detection increased from 0.01 to 0.2 and the penalty for traffic police bribery 
imposed on this officer would be 5 years in prison, i.e., loss of 60 monthly salaries58. In 
Ukraine, the fine rose 10-fold and the new fine for speeding is from 250 to 350 
hryvnias, so 350 is the inflated fine and 250 is the real fine. In Georgia and Ukraine, the 
procedures for payment have been simplified, but more so in Georgia: to bribe still 
takes 5 minutes but total to receive a ticket and pay for it is takes 20 minutes; in Ukraine 
the new t1 total is 45 minutes. The remaining variables remain the same. 
 In this case, after reforms in Georgia, the maximum this driver is willing to offer 
is 16 lari, but the minimum this traffic police officer is willing to take is 9600 lari. In 
Ukraine after reform, the minimum this police officer is willing to take is 42.5 hryvnias, 
while the driver is willing to pay as much as 380 hryvnias: 
In Georgia: 9600 lari </ R </ 16.15 
In Ukraine: 42.5 hryvnias < R < 380.475 hryvnias 
Hence, in Georgia after reforms, this interaction would end up in a no-corruption 
equilibrium. The radical change in the Georgian case is coming primarily from the 
impact on the traffic policeman’s side and from the increased detection probability and 
significantly higher punishment costs; in this calibration exercise. Reducing the time it 
takes to process and pay for a fine has a substantial impact on the driver’s side, but not 
nearly as radical as the impact of changes on the traffic policeman’s side. This is in line 
with findings from the Georgian case study, where bribery significantly decreased.  
                                                 
58 For the purposes of simplicity, I assume that every detected bribe leads to five years in prison and I 
assume that the loss of salary is the only punishment imposed on the traffic policeman; currently in 
Georgia, the maximum fine for traffic police bribery is nine years in prison. While both are a little 
unrealistic, I consider that the fact that a prison sentence is worth more than living without salary 
compensates the fact that not every detected bribe leads to a less-than-maximum penalty. 
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In Ukraine after reforms, the equilibrium bribe is in possible range and therefore 
bribery would still take place. In fact, as the interval for R increased in Ukraine in this 
calibration exercise, compared to the interval before reforms, bribery would be even 
more likely to take place on the national level, given different drivers with different 
salaries, different violations, etc. This also indicates that the average bribe would be 
higher in Ukraine after the reforms. The significant change in the Ukrainian case is 
coming from several sources: the increased fine, the increased possibilities for fine-
inflation, and higher salaries for traffic policemen, which pushed the threshold for a 
minimum bribe upwards. In conclusion, this prediction is also in line with findings from 
the Ukrainian case, where the average bribe significantly increased and the overall level 
of traffic police bribery has increased. 
 The calibration exercise demonstrates that the model captures the difference in 
outcome of the Georgian and Ukrainian cases. Therefore, this is an acceptable model. 
As outlined in the beginning of this chapter, the shortcomings in the empirical 
applications of these models include the fact that macro-factors (replacement of old 
policemen with new policemen) are not taken into account because these models 
represents micro-interactions. For instance, dynamic modelling so as to include the role 
of past experience and cultural norms or pervasiveness of corruption beyond the 
psychological cost would be very useful and make the model even better. Further, a 
more critical test could be undertaken, outside the scope and time frame of this study, to 
determine whether this model explains the difference in outcome better than a simple 
cost-benefit crime model, where bribery is not taken into account. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter summarises the policy recommendations that are effective both 
theoretically and in practice and evaluates the contributions of this study in greater 
depth. Lastly, conclusions are drawn from the research with a special focus on support 
for traditional and new anti-corruption theories, types of human rationality, and 
applicability of game-theory. Several possibilities for future research on the subject are 
suggested. 
 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
Policy literature on anti-corruption relevant to traffic police bribery primarily 
consists of two analytical camps. One camp focuses the argument on what individual 
factors need to be targeted—such as the bureaucrats’ salaries, while the other camp 
approaches corruption dynamically, arguing that a drastic combination of changes needs 
to take place. On the question of wages and corruption, for instance, Svensson (2005) 
comes to a conclusion that higher wages lead to lower corruption, but only under certain 
circumstances. Theoretically, when the official’s wages are above the opportunity wage, 
one can ensure that the official will behave honestly (Becker and Stigler, 1974); yet 
when the official and bribe-giver can bargain over a bribe, “higher wage strengthens the 
official’s bargaining power as it raises the expected cost of being corrupt” (Mookherjee 
and Png, 2005, cited in Svensson, 2005). Cross-country studies find mixed evidence59. 
Di Tella and Schargrodsky’s (2003) empirical study of a crackdown on public hospitals 
in Buenos Aires and its relationship to hospital procurement policies revealed that 
                                                 
59 Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find evidence that higher wages deter corruption, but Rauch and 
Evans (2000) and Treisman (2000) find that the evidence is not robust 
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higher wages do have a negative effect, though only when audit intensity is of a 
medium or high level. Hence, in all the studies where the wage incentive led to lower 
corruption, the enforcement apparatus was well-functioning and independent. Without a 
third-party enforcement agency, raising wages alone is not effective, concludes 
Svensson (2005). 
The big-bang camp focuses on the large amount of change that is necessary to 
induce in order to fight corruption when it is widespread, and the importance of 
combining several changes simultaneously, as opposed to one defining policy. For 
instance, Mookherjee and Png (1995) show that the increase in the rewards or penalties 
has to be sufficiently large and discrete. More radically, Rothstein (2007) criticises the 
idea of incremental change when it comes to anti-corruption, and dismisses the presence 
of “keys”—entry-point for anti-corruption work that will set in motion significant 
institutional changes—in favour of a ‘big-bang’ approach. 
Policy recommendations resulting from this thesis focus on both—individual 
effective measures targeting each actor—as well as the magnitude and combination of 
measures. With the traffic police bribery, actors on both sides of the transaction need to 
be influenced, both the driver on the supply-side and the traffic policeman on the 
demand-side. The USAID survey and interview research on traffic police bribery in 
Ukraine highlights that currently, bribes are profitable to both drivers, policemen, and 
supervisors in the police structures, and argues that this is why anti-corruption measures 
in Ukraine thus far have been vastly ineffective (PACE, 2009). Besides affecting both 
sides in the bribe-transaction, the combination is best when both punishment and reward 
incentives are applied.  
On the policeman’s side, positive incentives include increasing the salaries as 
well as any other material positive incentives. Quotas have shown to be a questionable 
tool both theoretically and in the case of Ukraine; a better positive incentive is focus on 
accurate reporting without regard for the total number of officially-processed violations, 
similarly to the change of operation that took place in Georgia. As far as punishments, 
the theoretically and empirically proven measure is increasing the probability of 
detection. On the driver’s side, an important positive incentive is decreasing ticket-
processing time, time and effort required to pay for a fine, and decreasing the 
repercussions of a formal fine. Fines are also a strong measure, but in the presence of 
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widespread corruption, dramatically increasing the fines leads to higher corruption, not 
less violations. As much as this is counter-intuitive for road safety policy, decreasing 
formal fines and decreasing the repercussions of official fines is an effective anti-
corruption tool because it makes bribery less profitable for drivers. The question of road 
safety is an important one and also needs to be take into account, but it beyond the 
purpose of this paper. In the presence of authoritarian police, an equally effective 
measure is increasing driver’s bargaining power via reducing policeman’s possibilities 
for fine-inflation.  
How expensive and feasible is the set of measures suggested in the previous 
paragraph? Increasing the salaries of traffic policemen and increasing the probability of 
detection are the most costly elements. Substantially increasing wages is fiscally 
burdensome while increasing the probability of detection requires a technological 
upgrade in practice. On the other hand, simplifying rules of the road, instituting positive 
incentives based on recording of all cases as opposed to informal quotas, decreasing 
fines, repercussions, and possibilities for fine-inflation are the cheapest and most 
feasible measures. Nevertheless, all suggestions have to be seen as a whole set; trade-
offs between them imply significantly harsher changes, which could be counter-
productive. While increasing the salaries and probability of detection are both costly, 
both are also important. In fact, as past literature suggests, increasing the wages without 
an independent third-party agency that monitors corruption would not be effective. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Jain argued in 2001 that the focus of future corruption studies should be (1) to 
“build a comprehensive models of how corruption works at the micro as well as at the 
macro levels” (p.101) and (2) subject the models to empirical tests. Moreover, he noted, 
“research on effective mechanisms to solve corruption is 
even scarcer. Although we have a good idea of what 
approaches are possible, we do not have more than 
anecdotal information on which approaches work.” 
(p.102). 
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This study of traffic police bribery does just that. Modelling of utility payoffs has been 
derived from specifically-designed qualitative study to present determinants behind 
strategy selection at the micro-level, building a more comprehensive model. The three 
theoretical model variations of traffic police bribery were subjected to two empirical 
tests of anti-corruption reforms in the case of Georgia and in the case of Ukraine. As a 
result, this provides non-anecdotal information on which approaches work—such as the 
case of Georgia—and which do not.  
All in all, this thesis also accomplishes the original study aim—development of 
a game-theoretic framework for modelling of traffic police bribery—by building a 
model that produces results in line with the empirical cases. Besides filling the gap in 
research on the issues outlined by Jain (2001), this thesis also incorporates a regional 
dimension of transition countries to the above modelling.  
 Conceptually, this research generates additional support to both the wage theory 
of anti-corruption, as well as to the ‘big bang’ theory: affecting factors like wages, 
probability of detection, ticket-issuing procedures, simplifying rules and regulations are 
important components of anti-corruption programmes and need to be tackled 
simultaneously, so as to generate a rapid shift from a corruption to a no-corruption 
equilibrium. The insights from interviews revealed that respondents utilised all three 
types of rationalities—instrumental, bounded and expressive rationalities, suggesting 
that utility-maximising elements of the models have to be further augmented with 
incorporation of social norms and beliefs about behaviour of others. 
Hence, this research can and needs to be taken further. The modelling analysis 
does not include role of past experience and perception about others, while the case 
studies suggest that past experience is an important determinant, and that replacement 
of old police officers with new police officers is an effective tool. Suggestions for future 
research include incorporating dynamics of evolutionary game theory, based on Young 
(1998), and Mishra (2006) analysis relating to persistence of corruption. Alternatively 
or concurrently, the aims of the state (that implements the anti-corruption measures) 
could also be incorporated into the game, taking it away from a micro-level interaction, 
similarly to the work of Yao (1997). Experimental research where players role-play 
drivers and traffic policemen, given set variables and objectives, could be considered 
for further testing of the theoretical framework. Lastly, current methodological 
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shortcomings could be improved by including increasing the sample size beyond the 
forty-two cases of driver-traffic policeman interaction and incorporating additional 
empirical cases60. 
                                                 
60 For instance, Azerbaijan’s raise in salaries of traffic policemen that did not lead to a decrease in the 
level of corruption (Anon, 2005). 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Corruption and Traffic Fatalities 
 
Figure 13. Corruption and Traffic Fatalities Worldwide in 2009 
 
Sources: Transparency International (2009) and World Helath Organization (2009) 
 
Appendix 2.A. Interview topic guide for the driver 
 
“The aim of this research is to better understand the determinants of traffic 
police bribery in a country like Ukraine. In other words, what factors influence 
the decision of a driver to offer a bribe or to give a bribe. The interview is meant 
to be semi-structured, so besides answering the basic question, feel free to 
provide additional relevant information, explanations of the context, or your 
personal opinion. You may abstain from participation in the research and have 
the right to stop the interview at any point in time. Your replies will be kept 
confidential and neither your first nor your last name will not be used in the final 
version of the research.” 
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Characteristics:  
Age:       
Level of education   
Region of Ukraine   
Reason for responding to survey  
Personal biases/ how is different from an average driver: 
 
 
Capacity in which you are answering the question (how much do drive, how often 
stopped, in the past month, in the past year, for how many years driving) 
 
Personal experience with bribery situations (how many? If 2-3 describe. If many – 
most exemplary ones) 
 
Case 1:  
 
Case 2:  
 
Etc. 
 
Influencing factors that guide behavior (ask which are most important in a typical 
scenario)  
Save time (value of own’s time per hour) 
Complexity of procedures 
Low bribe cost 
Personal (past) experience 
Example from others 
Training/teaching by parents, internet 
Interaction with driver 
Interaction with others 
Punishment for bribery (legal, fine) 
Probability of detection 
Knowledge of law and rules of the road. 
 
 
Additional questions for clarification: 
Appendix 2.B. Interview topic guide for the policeman 
 
“The aim of this research is to better understand the determinants of traffic police 
bribery in a country like Georgia. In other words, what factors influence the decision of 
a traffic policeman to ask for a bribe or to accept a bribe. The interview is meant to be 
semi-structured, so besides answering the basic question, feel free to provide additional 
relevant information, explanations of the context, or your personal opinion. You may 
abstain from participation in the research and have the right to stop the interview at any 
point in time. Your replies will be kept confidential and neither your first nor your last 
name will not be used in the final version of the research.” 
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1. Characteristics:  
a. Age:       
b. Level of education    
c. Region of Ukraine    
d. Reason for responding to survey  
e. Personal biases/ how is different from an average driver: 
 
2. Capacity in which you are answering the question (how long have you worked, 
in what positions, what rank, what duties, how many drivers stopped during a 
typical day) 
 
3. Personal experience with bribery situations (how many? If 2-3 describe. If many 
– most exemplary ones) 
 
Case 1:  
 
Case 2:  
 
Etc. 
 
1. Influencing factors that guide behaviour 
a. Need for money (low salary) 
b. Organizational structure / kickbacks to bosses 
c. Personal (past) experience 
d. Example from others 
e. Training/teaching 
f. Interaction with driver 
g. Interaction with others 
h. Punishment for bribery (legal, fine) 
i. Probability of detection 
 
Additional questions for clarification: 
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Appendix 3. Structured interview summaries 
 
D1. Driver respondent no.1 (8 cases) 
Age: 20-30. University education, medical. From Kiev. 
Works as a dentist, salary $10 per hour. Driving since 
2006, not a careful driver. 
 
Case 1.1. Year 2005 or 2006. Father was driving, exceeded speed limit. Traffic police 
officer stopped him, wrote out a protocol, but the protocol never reached their address. 
Driver used this example as a past experience before the new fines that writing a 
protocol does not definitely mean paying a fine. 
 
Case 1.2. Year 2006. 2 months after receiving the driving license, the driver was 
speeding 20-30km/h over the speed limit. Traffic police officer stopped, said that was 
speeding, showed the speed on ‘Fara’ device, and first suggested, “Should we write out 
the protocol?”, driver answered “OK”. Driver remember that another time when father 
was speeding, the result was that the protocol somehow never reached Kiev. In this 
situation too, traffic policeman wrote out the protocol, but it never arrived by mail. The 
process took 20-25 minutes. A bribe for this violation would have been about 50 UAH. 
 
Case 1.3. Year 2007. Driver exceeded the speed limit twice over; driver was in a hurry. 
Traffic policeman said, “let’s do the protocol”, to which the driver replied “why should 
you have to do the paperwork, I’m in a rush, let’s solve this on the spot”, took out a 50 
UAH bill from the wallet and handed it to the traffic policeman, saying “is it enough?”. 
Traffic policeman replied, “yes, this is enough, have a safe trip.” In this case, the driver 
thought that the bribe was very close to the official fine, but the whole process took 
only 5 minutes and ‘was worth it’. 
 
Case 1.4. Year 2009, new fines. Driver overtook another car on a highway where it was 
not allowed. Another driver saw this and called the traffic police officer operating 10km 
ahead to signal to stop the yellow car. Traffic police officer called the original driver 
and another driver as two witnesses and insisted on writing out the protocol for a 500 
UAH fine. The Driver-violator tried to convince the traffic police officer to take a bribe, 
as high as to the full amount of the fine. Traffic police officer categorically refused and 
the driver wondered if this was indeed a set-up because it looked like the policeman 
really needed this protocol. The situation resulted in a protocol of a violation, and took 
40-45 minutes. The driver paid 500 UAH fine, at the bank; the whole process to pay a 
fine took 20 minutes, including waiting in line. 
 
Case 1.5. Year 2009, new fines. Driver was driving with an unfastened seatbelt. Driver 
offered the traffic policeman 50 UAH, traffic policeman said “not enough, but if you 
double it, it would be ok to let you go”. Driver gave 100 UAH and traffic policeman let 
driver go without a protocol of violation. 
 
Case 1.6. Year 2010, new fines. Weather was bad, and the traffic policeman stopped the 
driver and told the driver “clean the plates or I will fine you for 350 UAH”. Driver 
argued that it was understandable for the plates to have some dirt and said that would 
clean it at home without scratching the car. Traffic policeman said ok and let the driver 
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go. Driver felt that this was an occasion where traffic policeman was trying to make 
extra money, but didn’t manage to extort it. 
 
Case 1.7. Year 2008, summer, before the new fines. Driver crossed a solid line. Traffic 
police officer stopped the car, introduced, and insisted that the driver follow to the 
patrol car. In the car, traffic policeman showed driver an album with the photographs of 
all traffic deaths that took place in that area. After that, officer let the driver go. The 
driver forgot about it only 30 minutes later, since the driver works in the morgue and 
has seen much more disgusting corpses. 
 
Case 1.8 Year 2008. Pedestrian cause a bumper-to-bumper where the driver was 
involved. Traffic police was called, wrote out a protocol properly; nobody was fines and 
nobody had to give a bribe. For the driver, insurance covered all the damages. 
 
Statements: 
1. “Time and laziness to have to go and pay for the fine somewhere else have 
always been the greatest motivating factors. Also, getting a fine ruins your mood 
for the day, whereas paying it on the spot helps to forget about it and not feel 
bad.” 
2. “I do not have a pre-determined strategy and usually decide whether to bribe or 
not spontaneously, although heavy past experience with bribe-giving sets a 
precedent of course.” 
3. “Knowing that I can pay the policeman off on the street possibly encourages me 
to drive less carefully, but I would never use that excuse to sit drunk behind a 
wheel, that would be dangerous in the first place.” 
4. “The first time it felt a little awkward to give a bribe, but now it comes very 
naturally to me.” 
5. “I have been stopped about 30 times, always because I violated traffic rules. I 
had to pay the fine once, I have been let go twice, and only once the fine did not 
reach my address. All other times (about 26 out of 30, i.e., 86% of the time), I 
solved the issue on the spot by paying a relatively small bribe of 50 UAH.” 
 
D2. Driver respondent no.2 (4 cases) 
Age: 20-30. University education. Western Ukraine/Kiev. 
Has been driving officially for 7 years, is stopped 3 times 
per month on average. Works as a lawyer on the side. 
Hourly salary $5. 
 
Case 2.1: Year 2009. Driver overtook traffic policeman’s car. Inspector came up, 
introduced himself, asked to show documents. Driver turned on the camera, showed the 
documents, asked the inspector to show the documents. Read out the names and  the 
information on the documents. Asked for the reason why was stopped. Inspector invited 
driver to come inside the car, but driver stayed in the car. Inspector wrote out the 
protocol of violation, the copies, showed the driver where to sign. Driver wrote in the 
protocol that he does not agree, that he did not violate anything, crossed out that there 
were no witnesses. Signed, takes a copy. The total processing time was 20-25 minutes. 
When the mailed notification came from the court, the driver went to the court. The 
charge was dropped based of the lack of evidence.  
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Case 2.2: Year 2008, before the fines in Ukraine were increased. Driver was driving 
drunk behind the wheel. Traffic policeman stopped the driver, stated what the driver 
was violating, and kept repeating “You know, this will cost at least 800 UAH”. Driver 
understood this was a signal that a bribe was possible, and offered 50 UAH. Inspector 
said “too little”, driver said that does not have any more. Inspector agreed to 50 UAH. 
 
Case 2.3: Year 2009. Driver crossed a double yellow line. Traffic patrol car was turning 
the corner and stopped the driver. Driver knew that the fine would have been at least 
450 UAH and the driver would have lost the driving license for 6 months. Driver 
understood that this was the beginning of the shift and traffic policeman could be 
flexible. Driver asked the traffic policeman whether something could be done, and 
mentioned that knows a colleague in the same traffic police department. Driver said that 
has very little money in the wallet tonight. Inspector replied “give whatever you have.” 
Driver gave 20 UAH. The whole process took 10 minutes. 
 
Case 2.4: Year 2005. Driving on an intercity highway at night, missed the post of traffic 
police and did not stop on the stop sign. Driver explained the extenuating circumstances 
of the situation, that was driving to begin university studies and was not very careful. 
Traffic police officer let the driver go without a fine. 
 
Statements:  
1. “Case 2.1 was a typical case, and whenever I physically went to court and 
disputed a fine, the charge was dropped 70% of the time.”  
2. “If I can see that there is no case for me to dispute in court and I would have to 
pay a fine anyway, I am ready to pay a bribe instead.” 
3. “If I don’t have the 20 minutes to fill out the protocol of violation (which I 
would then dispute in court), I prefer to give a bribe instead.” 
4. “Every time I had a camera on me to record the situation, the traffic policeman 
always officially documented the situation with a protocol of violation.” 
5. “On average, I have been  let go without a fine or a protocol 35-40% of the 
time.” 
6. “On average, only 5% of the time I ended up paying a bribe.” 
7. “Sometimes, when the traffic policeman has to fulfil the quota (for example, if 
for the inspector it has been a quiet night and the shift is coming to an end), will 
never take a bribe” 
 
D3. Driver respondent no.3 (5 cases) 
Age: 20-30. University education, Kiev. Has been driving 
for 6 years, stopped 10-15 times total. Works in IT. Salary 
$10 per hour. 
 
Case 3.1: Year 2006. Driver was stopped in the countryside for a minor violation. Fine 
was minimal, 17 UAH. Paid officially. 
 
Case 3.2: Year 2005. Driver was driving to work in the morning, went the wrong way 
into a one-way street. “Kobra” department of police stopped the driver, asked to take 
the keys out and come to the police car. Driver asked why was stopped. Police officer 
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answered that a special operation is going on—checking all the cars of this make and 
model. Driver was not in a hurry, but had 25 UAH in the wallet. Driver knew that 
“Kobra” policemen are not supposed to be issuing tickets for traffic violations, and 
understood that wanted a bribe. Policemen signalled, “so what are we going to do, Mr 
so and so?”, driver replied “let’s write a protocol of traffic violation” since driver knew 
that “Kobra” policemen had no authority to write protocols of traffic violation. 
Policemen said “ok, you can go then, but don’t violate again.” 
 
Case 3.3. Year 2009, after the fines were increased. Driver was approaching Kiev, on a 
business trip, in a hurry. Driver stopped at the stop sign, but the traffic policeman said 
that did not stop at the stop sign. Inspector said, “what will we be doing” and then 
named the price: 100 UAH. Driver was surprised that inspector named the price, but 
thought it was better not to bargain and paid. Did not want the fine to be known about at 
the job. The size of the bribe was small enough not to worry about it. Driver knew that 
the policeman would have taken whatever the driver gives him, no matter how small an 
amount, since the objective of a policeman was to maximise the number of cars stops, 
not to milk each individual driver. However, did not have time to bargain and 
financially 100 UAH at the salary of 10USD per hour was ok. 
 
Case 3.4 Year 2005. Driver was crossing the border of Ukrainian regions, stopped to 
buy coffee, 50m in front of traffic police control post. Driver asked the policeman how 
to get to one town, got into the car, and same policeman stopped the driver. Policeman  
said, “where you stopped before, it was not allowed to stop”. Driver argued that he 
didn’t know, showed the documents. Policeman said “you are a good guy, I won’t fine 
you. We’ll put in the protocol that you were a pedestrian, crossed the road in the wrong 
place.” For a 8.5 UAH fine. No protocol ever reached Kiev and the driver never paid 
anything. 
 
Case 3.5. Year 2006.  Driver’s friend (another driver) was stopped when driving a 
motorcycle, left insurance at home. Friend paid the fine, 425 UAH, paid manually in the 
office of traffic police. Six months later, had to change the tech-passport, the fine came 
up as unpaid. Spent a whole day between the two offices, because originally the clerk at 
the office did not manually put a check mark that the fine was paid. Complications and 
is problematic when there are official fines on record. 
 
Statements: 
1. “In Ukraine, it is not possible to live without ever bribing anyone. This is the 
mentality, the way of thinking. Nobody trusts anyone else; you watch your own 
back.” 
2. “Past experience and commonplace pervasiveness of corruption makes a 
difference. To get a piece of paper, from passport to apartment registration, to 
car inspection, to medicines, need to pay up extra unofficially.” 
3. “Before the fines were increased, I never gave bribes. It was easier to pay the 
fine.” 
4. “Financial factor is very important. People (and  I ) are afraid to be left without 
money, should the formal fine have to be paid.” 
5. “I understand that the traffic policeman has to have at least one protocol during 
one day’s work.” 
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6. “Laws change very frequently, only 30-40% of drivers know up-to-date 
legislation and specific rules, rights.” 
7. “In Ukraine, as a driver, I never thought I could be punished for giving a bribe.” 
 
D4. Driver respondent no.4 (4 cases) 
Age: over 60. Education: higher. Works as a professor in 
university. From Tbilisi. Does not like bribes – personal 
bias. Driver since 1957, every day during the period 
1990-2009. 
 
Case 4.1. Early 80s. Driver was driving to a city outside Tbilisi, 70 km/h, and was 
stopped by a traffic policeman. Inspector argued that violated a rule, driver argued that 
didn’t (argument over interpretation of traffic sign). Inspector wrote down driver’s 
personal details and made holes in the driving license. Driver complained to traffic 
police office that protocol of violation was incorrect, argued about the traffic sign, and 
threatened to complain to someone in higher command. Traffic police office issued the 
driver a fictitious certificate that driver was employed by traffic police. Driver has 
rarely been stopped since. 
 
Case 4.2. 70s. Driver was driving from Gori and was stopped by a policeman. 
Policeman warned him that there will be ice on the road after the turn. 
 
Case 4.3. 90s. Driver was driving in the village. Traffic policeman stopped the driver 
and asked why driver did not start driving differently when saw police car. Driver 
insisted to make protocol in case some traffic law was violated. Traffic policeman let 
the driver go. 
 
Case 4.4. 2006. Received a parking ticket on a new parking spot. Has not been stopped 
since the reforms, has only received parking tickets. 
 
Statements: 
1. “The primary objective of the driver is to save most money possible. When 
stopped by  a policeman, driver knows that has to pay something, so the idea is 
to pay the least. Bargaining over the size of the bribe definitely takes places, 
openly or not.” 
2. Traffic policeman’s signal was “The fine is this much. You may give me the 
money and I can pay the fine for you.” 
3. “Georgians tend to violate traffic rules a lot; this is Georgian temper.” 
4. “Traffic police officers used to catch violators for money; now that they have to 
maximise the number of records, they just give out parking tickets.” 
5. “I have never personally experienced any examples with quotas, but I know they 
did exist.” 
6. “In Georgia, there are now very many places where one can pay the fine, so it is 
much easier, and this is less incentive to give bribes.” 
 
D5. Driver respondent no.5 (10 cases) 
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Age: 50-60. Education: higher technical. From Tbilisi. 
Has been driving for 22 years, very frequently. Works as 
an engineer. 
 
Case 5.1. Year 1999. Forgot medication certificate at home. Traffic policeman stopped 
the driver on the charge that driver was drunk. Driver offered 5 lari, but the policeman 
said it was too little. Driver insisted to go to the clinic instead, so that doctor would 
determine his intoxication status. Doctor concluded that driver was not drunk. When 
driver was leaving the clinic, inspector asked for 5 lari and the driver gave it. 
 
Case 5.2. Around 1993. Driver did give the turn signal and the traffic policeman 
stopped  the driver. Traffic policeman wanted to write the protocol. Driver suggested to 
first solve it differently, but didn’t have the money in the wallet. Traffic policeman let 
the driver go home pick up the money. Driver picked up the money and brought 5 lari 
for the traffic policeman. Driver and this traffic policeman became friends afterwards. 
Driver frequently passed this road, but traffic policeman never stopped him again. 
Salary at the time was 300 lari per month, i.e., 2 lari per hour. The official salary of 
traffic policeman was about 100 lari per month at the time. 
 
Case 5.3. Year 2002. Traffic police was conducting ‘raids’ (stopping every car) for 
checks. Even though driver did not violate anything, traffic officer stopped and asked to 
see the first aid kit. Driver offered a bribe, but officer said no, because “they had to 
write protocols.” Police officer wrote a protocol and driver had to pay it later. 
 
Case 5.4. Year 1989. Driver was driving without a driving license, on an official car 
from work. Traffic policeman stopped the driver, and asked for 50 rubles for a bribe. 
Driver said that did not have any money on him, just 17 rubles, showed empty pockets. 
Traffic policeman took  17 rubles and let the driver go.  
 
Case 5.5. Year 2000. At 6am, driver was driving and traffic policeman stopped driver 
for no reason. The inspector said said, “listen it’s 6am and I have to stand here, can you 
please give me 5 lari?” the driver felt pity for the policeman and gave policeman the 
money. 
 
Case 5.6. Year 2003.  Driver was driving intoxicated and bumped the bumper of a bus 
from behind. Driver started bargaining with traffic policemen. In the end, traffic 
policemen agreed to take a bribe and let the driver arrange the rest with the bus driver. 
Bribe to policemen was 120 lari, and payment to the bus driver, to fix the bumper, was 
40 lari. 
  
Case 5.7. Year 2006, after reform. Driver parked in the wrong place. Traffic policeman 
asked, “do you like how you parked your car?”, driver answered “no”, policeman:  
“OK, I will give you a fine.” The fine was 10 lari. At the time , driver had 800 lari 
salary per month, i.e., 5 lari per hour. The fine-issuing process took 7-8 minutes. 
 
Case 5.8. Year 2008. Driver of the car was drunk. Traffic police stopped the car, 
checked that the driver was drunk. Traffic policeman wrote out the fine and suggested 
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to call for a sober driver. Because it was late at night and it was impolite to disturb 
anyone, traffic policeman drove the drunk driver and drunk passengers back home. 
 
Case 5.9 Year 2009. Driver was an important person and drunk. Traffic policeman 
stopped the car, driver introduced who s/he was, and the traffic inspector immediately 
began compiling protocol.  
 
Case 5.10. Year 2010. Driver was driving home from the sea. Was tired and stopped on 
the curb. Patrol came and asked whether the driver was ok or had nay problems. 
 
Statements: 
1. “Bargaining took place very often. With rubbles during the Soviet union times, 
and with lari after independence.” 
2. “Most often , policeman was correct about a violation, I haven’t heard of cases 
where policeman stopped the driver and asked for a bribe even though the driver 
did not violate anything.” 
3. “Bribe size was always less than the actual fine. This was the greatest motivator 
to bribe.” 
4. “I never considered the possibility of being caught for giving a bribe and the 
potential punishment. Knew that there was a theoretical possibility for the traffic 
policeman to be punished, but never practically considered this possibility.” 
5. “In case 5.4., my boss knew that I was driving without a license, but still gave 
me the keys. If the boss knew that bribing was not an option, and that I would 
definitely be fined if caught, he would not have given me the keys to the car.” 
6. “Since the reform, I have been driving 5 years, but have been fined only 3 times, 
and because I actually parked in the wrong place.” 
7. “Before reforms, driver’s licence would be taken away for driving  drunk. Now, 
the first time the fine is 150 lari, second time 300 lari, third time 800 lari, etc.” 
8. “Paying for a fine in the bank is very easy now.” 
9. “My relatives talked about bad experiences with trying to bribe a traffic 
policeman after the reform. I would not dare to try and bribe because he knows 
by word of mouth that this is not possible any more, even if the fine was very 
high.” 
 
D6. Driver respondent no.6 (8 cases) 
Age: 30-40. Higher education in sociology. From Kiev. 
Very careful driver. Driving since October 2007. Works 
as company manager, salary $10. 
 
Case 6.1. Year 2008, before the fines were increased. Driver was turning from the 
wrong lane onto the bridge, then saw the traffic patrol car. Traffic police officer made 
an introduction, asked for documents. Driver passed the documents. Driver explained 
the situation, traffic policeman saw the child in the back of the car. Driver admitted that 
was turning from the wrong lane. Traffic policeman asked driver to go to the patrol car. 
Wrote out the protocol in the car. Driver did not know whether there was a signal for a 
bribe or not, so did not risk it. The whole process took 15 minutes. 
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Case 6.2. Year 2008, before the fines were increased. Driver made a turn on the wrong 
signal. Traffic policeman stopped the driver. Driver’s child was on the back seat of the 
car, asking “why did we have to stop?” Driver asked the inspector “what did I violate?”, 
traffic policeman explained that the light had not yet turned green. Driver disagreed and 
went with the traffic policeman to look at the light. Traffic policeman was correct and 
the fine would have been 17 UAH. Previously, driver talked to friends who advised to 
always keep some low-value bills in the passport just in case, and the driver had 10 
UAH in the passport sleeve. Traffic policeman started asking for additional documents, 
which driver did not have and what carried a heavier fine. Driver perceived this as a 
tactic to inflate the potential fine and induce the driver to bribe. Driver suggested that 
the traffic policeman looks at the documents, including the page with the sleeve of the 
passport. Traffic policeman took the money and let the driver go. The whole process, 
including arguing and walking, took 15 minutes. 
 
Case 6.3.  Winter 2008, new fines. Driver parked by McDonald’s illegally, with 
emergency lights on, passenger went to buy burgers. Traffic police patrol came up, 
explained the situation and left. Traffic police patrol car came up again. Policeman 
asked the driver to follow to the car. In the car, officer used the phrase “what are we 
going to do now?” but the driver did not perceive with certainty that this was a signal. 
Protocol took 25 minutes to write, fine was 300 UAH. Driver paid the fine within 7 
days. 
 
Case 6.4. Year 2007, end-of –the year. Picking up a passenger from the airport, parked 
for 30 seconds in the wrong place. Traffic policeman noticed and insisted on recording 
the violation, “if I don’t record this, I won’t get a Christmans premium.” Also pointed to 
the cameras and insisted that cannot just let the driver and passenger go without a fine, 
or with a bribe. Passenger showed a diplomatic passport. Inspector let them go. 
 
Case 6.5. Year 2010. Driver was coming back with family from a skiing trip, turned on 
the lights from the wrong lane, was a little lost. Traffic police s topped, asked for 
documents, insurance. Driver showed all the documents. Driver admitted that violated 
but explained that was lost and asked for directions. Child in the back of the car 
screamed “why were we stopped, I wanna go home!”. Traffic policeman looked inside 
the car at the child, provided driving directions and let the driver and passengers go. 
 
Case 6.6. Year 2009. Driver did not have full lights turned on, only half-way but it was 
still kind of light outside. Traffic police stopped, checked the documents, asked why 
driver was driving without the lights. Driver explained that when started driving it was 
still very light. Driver said, “are you really going to fine me for having the lights turned 
on half-way? On the street so and so there are many cars dangerously parked over the 
tram lines. It’s more just to fine people there” Traffic policeman let the driver go. 
 
Case 6.7. Year 2009. Another car next to driver’s car turned incorrectly. Traffic police 
stopped driver’s car. Driver asked why was stopped, and explained that the other car  
violated the rule but this car didn’t. Showed that knew the rules very thoroughly. Traffic 
police said, “wow, you even know these rules?” and let the driver go. 
 
97 
 
Case 6.8. Year 2004. Driver had a driving license, but was driving another person’s car, 
without paperwork from original driver that authorised another driver. Driver drove 
extremely slowly, traffic police stopped and asked why “driving so slowly, maybe you 
are drunk?” Driver answered that it is illegal to drive drunk, showed the documents, and 
explained that it was only the second time driving a car since getting the license. Traffic 
police asked how far had to go and whether needed help getting there. Driver said that 
can manage, and inspector let the car go without a fine. 
 
Statements: 
1. “If you do not argue with the traffic policeman and do not bargain, but admit the 
violation and ask for the protocol, then it is a lot quicker.” 
 
P1. Police respondent no.1 
Age: 20-30. University education. From Western Ukraine. 
Worked with DPS (street patrol service) in a small 
Ukrainian town, side-by-side with traffic police service, 
while the two services were merged together, for 3 
months. Salary $200, same for traffic police. 
 
Statements: 
1. “Probability of detection of bribery in traffic police is very low, 10%. This could 
only happen if VV investigates illegal activities of the police. Punishment would 
be imprisonment for several years, or losing a job, depending how well-
connected the inspector is.” 
2. “Traffic policemen in Ukraine have an unofficial quota, to write protocols of 2 
drunk drivers per night. During the holidays, the number is higher. Chiefs of 
police departments compete based on their numbers (the more traffic offenders 
fines, the better), and at the end of every month there is a meeting to see which 
regional department performed best, and which department performed worst.” 
3. “Before the fines were increased, for a lower-level traffic policeman who earns 
1000 UAH per month, income from bribes could be 500 UAH, or even less. 
After the fines increased, income from bribes could be 1000-2000 UAH. From 
daily bribe income, majority went for lunches, coffee, to fuel the car; maximum 
20% would be left over to split among the two traffic policemen.” 
4. “Policemen have to pay for their own fuel for the car, small amount for various 
awards and paperwork, which should officially be paid for by the government.” 
5. “Checking driver’s documents and writing out the protocol cannot take less than 
20 minutes, because driver has to show 4 things (car registration, technical 
passport, driving license, insurance) 
6. “Signals used by the policemen include statements like “shall we think what to 
do about this?”, “let’s consider solving this issue differently”, or calling the 
driver into the car. Approximately, if the bribe takes place, half the time driver 
hints first, another half the time policeman hints first. 
 
 
P2. Police respondent no.2 (3 cases) 
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Age: 40-50. Police academy education. From Tbilisi. 
Worked for 10 years as police captain. On average took 
less bribes than colleagues. Salary 120 lari per month. 
 
Case 2.1. Officer stopped a driver for violating rules like speeding, traffic signs, or 
driving on the red light. Officer told the driver the amount of official fine. Driver gave 
me relatively small amount of money and I did not fine him 
 
Cse 2.2. Year 2002. Officer stopped a drunk driver who was speeding and dangerously. 
The official fine for this violation was 150 lari. Driver said that was at the wedding and 
it was ok to drink at the wedding. Officer told the driver to take the bus home and leave 
the car at the police patrol station. Next day, the driver came to pick up his car, dropped 
off  50 lari for the policeman and said that was grateful that did not receive a fine and 
police helped to get home safely. 
 
Case 2.3. Year 2003. Driver drove on the red light and officer stopped the driver. Driver 
said that was in a rush, gave 10 lari and left. Officer shared the money with the partner. 
 
 
Statements: 
1. “As a policeman I could feel safe, and this is why I chose this job. Safe from 
other ‘thief in laws’, from other policemen, from criminals and from poverty. At 
first I liked being a policeman.” 
2. “In order to stop widespread corruption in Georgia, the government did not have 
the other choice but to fire everyone.” 
3. “I stopped about 20-30 cars per day on average, and significant majority resulted 
in bribes.” 
4. “I only stopped people who were violating traffic rules. The most frequent 
violations were speed, violations of street signs, racing, parking, driving on red 
light, driving drunk. 
5. “Case 2.1. was a typical case.” 
6. Violantion   Official fine   Average bribe 
Driving drunk   150 lari   50-100 lari 
Parking   5 lari    3 lari 
Speeding   10 lari    5 lari 
Dangerous speeding  25 lari    10-15 lari 
Driving on red light  20 lari    5-10 lari 
Street sign violation  5-10 lari   3-5 lari 
7. “It was normal to let people go without warning, except when were driving 
drunk, then never.” 
8. “It was not very common to bargain. There was always the possibility that if you 
demanded too much, driver could file a claim with the general inspection and 
you would be punished by losing a job or having to pay as much as 1000 lari.” 
9. “In Georgia it was ok to offer a bribe, you wouldn’t get in trouble even if 
someone refused. Because by offering a bribe, you offered a gift, and there is 
nothing wrong with a gift.” 
10. “Fuel and technology (radar detectors, etc.) were provided after 2000, before – 
not.” 
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11. “Our supervisor was a good man, he cared about the employeed and about 
traffic safety. We tried our best to control the traffic safety, and the bribes and 
money came secondary. Money was not our primary objective. We just took the 
money because the system was like that.” 
12. “The quotas were very unofficial. Supervisors decided whether you worked hard 
enough; if not, your quotas would go up; if you didn’t make any money that also 
meant you were not working hard enough.” 
13. Two greatest influencing factors: need for money/low salary, and the 
organisational structure. 
14. “It was unimaginable to do otherwise.” 
15. “I was different from other policemen because I would only take money if 
someone really violated something, I would not take money from poor people. 
But there was no choice, the court and every system, involved unofficial 
payments.” 
 
P3. Police respondent no.3 
Age: 40-50. Higher education. From Kiev. Works in the 
ministry of interior.  
 
Statements 
1. “Traffic police supervisors can give orders that officer needs to have more 
protocols, or less protocols. If traffic rate increases (holidays, summer), officers 
will need to write more protocols. There is no official quota, maybe just 
unofficial. If an officer was working all day, but did not write any protocols, 
means that was not working, so obviously has to have at least one protocol per 
work day.” 
2.  “More traffic violations are not always better or worse. There is comparison 
with previous years, for the region, etc.” 
3. “For traffic policeman, the incentive to take a bribe is extra money. For driver, 
the incentive to bribe is to avoid or solving unnecessary problems that formal 
fine entails.” 
4. “Laws are set out so that the inspector always knows the laws better than the 
driver and can take advantage. Laws change very frequently, are very complex, 
average driver doesn’t follow the changes and can be easily fined.” 
5. “Salary of entry-level policeman is 1500 UAH per month. Rent and minimum 
food costs 1200 UAH per month, thus not enough for minimum living 
conditions. 
6. “Chance of getting caught may be 1 out of 100, or 1 out of 1000. Usually the 
focus of the anti-corruption department within police is on bigger issues, nobody 
bothers to chase individual traffic police bribery.” 
7. “Fuel for the car, repairs, technological equipment should theoretically be 
provided by the government.” 
8. Additional factors that influence the driver: “if violation was quite minor, 
without a significant impact on road safety, then there is more likelihood to take 
a bribe, as the driver does not deserve full punishment. Human factor also 
influences, for example, fining a pregnant woman is not appropriate.” 
9. “The general idea is that the officer’s job is to have good ‘pokazateli’ (number 
of protocols) and the officer will be trying to do their job well by having good 
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number of protocols. There are no positive financial incentives like premiums of 
the amount of protocols, maybe for chiefs of departments.” 
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